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The use of commercial and private Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) is becoming increasingly 
popular for both commercial and private use.  In Australian alone, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority 
stated that in 2018 the number of remote pilot licenses had increased by 53% over the previous year. 
Recent public discourse regarding UAV usage and regulation is centred around public privacy and safety 
which regulations aim to address. Whilst most jurisdictions have implemented key guidelines and 
licensing procedures for piloting UAVs, there is marginal consensus amongst regulators and a limited 
view towards a unified standard.  Can there be marginal consensus between the regulations whilst still 
addressing the concerns identified in the research? 
The purpose of this research project is to investigate what the key challenges and issues are that 
affect the use of UAVs and determine if current regulations are meeting those challenges.  During an 
extensive literature review the primary issues revolving around privacy, safety, security, public nuisance 
and trespass were examined.   From this research a set of criteria was developed to enable a comparative 
analysis to be performed against existing UAV regulations to determine how they were meeting the 
issues identified.  Five countries were chosen from usage data and length of time between regulatory 
reviews ensuring any analysis was performed on regulations that were up to date.  These countries were: 
Australia, Canada, EU, UK and the US. 
The regulations from each of the countries were then compared against the developed criteria. 
During the comparative analysis there were clear shortfalls with all regulations falling to meet some of 
the criteria.  These results confirmed what previous researchers had found as key issues were still failing 
to be addressed.  From these results, recommendations were put forth providing avenues for closing the 
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1.1 BACKGROUND 
The use of commercial and private Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) is becoming increasingly 
popular for both commercial and private use.  In Australian alone, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority 
stated that in 2018 the number of remote pilot licenses had increased by 53% over the previous year.   
With the increase in number of UAVs operating in the national airspace there comes a greater need for 
regulation to ensure the safety and privacy of the public.  However, as politicians and regulators aim to 
catch up with the increasing number of UAVs, researchers urge caution should be applied as regulation 
can both promote and suppress innovation (Nakamura & Kajikawa 2017) as UAV use and development 
needs surety to continue to be viable.   Molina and Campos (2018) state that within the European market 
the two most prevalent issues regarding regulation are security and safety considerations.  However, as 
Europe contains multiple independent countries with scattered non uniform regulations, over regulation 
can be the principal hurdle to surmount (Molina & Campos 2018).  Morales, Paez and Arangos (2015) 
multi-criteria analysis of UAV regulations stated that in certain countries the regulatory limitations 
imposed on the commercialisation of the technology were “notorious”. 
Recent public discourse regarding UAV usage and regulation is centred around public privacy 
and safety which regulations aim to address (Nakamura & Kajikawa 2017; Luppicini & So 2016; Sanz 
et al. 2015).  Whilst most jurisdictions have implemented key guidelines and licensing procedures for 
piloting UAVs, there is marginal consensus amongst regulatory bodies and a limited view towards a 
universal standard (Stöcker et al. 2017).  The same UAVs operating in the same set of circumstances 
are bound by different guidelines and regulations depending on the country they are operating in.  These 
regulations can differ wildly with respect to flying height, flying proximity to people/buildings and 
weight classes.  These regulatory differences add additional complexities for a person to navigate when 
planning and flying UAVs, whether it’s for commercial or private use.  Whilst UAV operators in 
Australia are bound by a single regulator, the Civil Aviation Authority (CASA), a person in the European 
Union (EU) could have to contend with and be well versed in a multitude of regulations encompassing 
numerous jurisdictions (Herrmann 2017). 
1.2 AIMS 
The aim of this project is to research and compare existing UAV regulations across diverse 
jurisdictions, determine the key problems and issues that arise from the use of UAVs, develop a set of 
criteria to attempt to resolve problems identified and determine if existing regulations address these 
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issues.  By identifying if the key issues such as privacy, safety and security are being addressed, 
recommendations will be made to mitigate any discrepancies found in the regulations.  
 
1.3 OBJECTIVES 
 The objectives of this project are as follows: 
1. Determine the existing state of UAV regulations. 
2. Determine the similarities and differences in existing regulations. 
3. Define the key problems that arise from the use of UAVs. 
4. Develop a set of criteria to resolve the key problems. 
5. Using the criteria, examine if existing regulations address the key problems. 
6. Provide recommendations addressing any shortfalls in the regulations. 
 
1.4 LIMITATIONS 
Although this project seeks to research UAV regulations across a variety of jurisdictions, due to 
limited time and scope only a small selection of regulations has been analysed.  These were chosen 
based on UAV usage numbers, existing established UAV regulations and length of time between 
regulatory reviews.  Countries with limited regulations or limited usage data available were excluded 
from the analysis.  Other limitations found during research for this paper were that although there is 
significant data available relating to use of UAVs by the military, the primary focus of this paper is on 
the commercial and private/recreational use of UAVs.  Additionally, the research in this paper was 
completed during a time when there was an increased interest in UAV reform.  Numerous countries 
were investigating the need for changes to their UAV guidelines with several jurisdictions in the process 
of transitioning to new regulations.  As such, the intention of the research and analysis in this paper is 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The primary aim of this literature review is to identify the current challenges affecting the use of 
UAVs.  Although this research will be guided by the key tenets of privacy, safety and security, additional 
issues found during the review will be open to examination.  An investigation surrounding the 
development of regulations and any previous comparative analyses will also be identified.  Key statistics 
such as types of users and user numbers will be investigated to determine the countries that will be 
chosen for analysis later in the project.  The research contained in this literature review will form the 
foundation for the country selection component and criteria analysis discussed in the methodology 
chapter of this research paper. 
2.2 UAV HISTORY  
There is a belief by some that UAVs are new technology.  However, like most introduced civilian 
technologies, it was a tool created for the military.  UAVs, in their most primitive form date to 1849 
during the Austrian blockade of the Republic of Venice where the Austrians launched explosive laden 
balloons with half hour timers towards Venetians (Custers 2016). 
World War I and II saw an increase in sophistication and investment in unmanned aerial vehicles. 
In 1916 the Royal Air Force commissioned radio controlled remotely piloted planes fitted with 
explosives (Shaw 2014), whilst in 1917 in the United States radio controlled pilotless planes were being 
fitted with gyroscopes increasing their stability (Shaw 2014).  In 1940 the Germans produced the V-1 
rocket capable of hitting a target 250 kilometres away.  The petrol-powered single engine rocket was 
guided by a gyrocompass which went against the radio-controlled trend of the time.  Towards the end 
of World War II, the V-1 was striking approximately 25% of its targets (Carr 2016). 
Carr (2016) defines the Vietnam War as the turning point for UAV development with increased 
focus on their research and development integrating UAVs into a modern military.  Various autonomous 
navigation aids were implemented such as Star Tracker and the Transit System (Carr 2016).  As UAVs 
were becoming more and more capable and with modern militaries seeing opportunities to reduce the 
risk of pilot casualties, UAVs were tasked towards the riskier missions such as high-altitude 
reconnaissance flights.  With UAVs taking the place of airmen, pilots could then be diverted to less 
riskier missions (Buisan 2017). 
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Figure 1: Timeline of the History of UAVs (Price Waterhouse Coopers 2019) 
  
As shown in Figure 1, Modern UAVs have shifted from military use towards the science sector 
(Carr 2016) enabling them to take advantage of scientific advances which increased their applications 
in the commercial sector.  Examples include the ability to stay airborne for over 24 hours and achieving 
higher altitudes thanks to new materials and construction techniques (Carr 2016). 
2.3 REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT 
In 1919 the Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation (Paris Convention) validated 
the concept that the airspace above the seas was not in fact as free for navigation as the open ocean 
below (Marshall 2009).  The member States that were a party to the convention recognised that the 
airspace above the land and the waters controlled by states remained the exclusive jurisdiction of said 
states.  However, during peace times, providing the remaining provisions of the convention were 
adhered to, civilian aircraft would have free passage (Marshall 2009).   
The convention put forth the following principles: 
i.  Each nation has sovereignty over their airspace. 
ii.  Airspace rules must be applied equally to foreign and their own aircraft. 
iii.  Aircraft from member states are to be treated equally. 
iv.  Aircraft must have state registration and declare their nationality. 
(Paris Convention 1919) 
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The Paris Convention made no mention or attempt to address the need to regulate unmanned 
aircraft despite their extensive use during World War I.  The earliest attempt to regulate UAVs on an 
international level was via The Convention of International Civil Aviation.  The Convention of 
International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) came about in 1944 with the signatures of 52 states 
with the express intention of regulating international air travel (ICAO 2011).  With the ratification of 
the Convention in 1947, the International Civil Aviation Organisation was established with the purpose 
of establishing regulations on aircraft registration and safety and the use of international airspace (ICAO 
2011). 
Detailed in Article 8 of the Chicago Convention is the first mention of pilotless aircraft with 
respect to international regulations. 
 No aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot shall be flown without a pilot over 
the territory of a contracting State without special authorisation by that State in 
accordance with the terms of such authorisation.   
       (ICAO 1944, Article 8; Bradly 2013) 
The most recent step forward was in 2011 when The International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO) released the ICAO Circular 328 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) with the purpose to: 
1. Apprise States of the emerging ICAO perspective on the integration of UAS into non-segregated 
airspace and at aerodromes. 
2. Consider the fundamental differences from manned aviation that such integration will involve. 
3. Encourage States to help with the development of ICAO policy on Unmanned Aerial Systems 
(UAS) by providing information on their own experiences associated with these aircraft. 
(UAS Vision 2011) 
The ICAO (2011) stated that the Circular was the first step in the development of a comprehensive 
UAS regulation with the possibility of the policy aiding as an interim solution to standardising UAS 
regulations in Europe.  However, ICAOs Unmanned Aircraft Advisory Group is still working through 
Phase II by supporting the ICAO Secretariat in establishing a common global framework for unmanned 
aircraft system traffic management and no clear guideline has been established for global UAV 
regulation. 
2.4 RECENT COMPARISONS 
Morales, Paez and Arangos (2015) analysed the UAV regulations of six countries to put forth 
draft regulations for implementation in Columbia.  They determined that the main restrictions to flying 
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UAVs in Colombia would be guided by the six analysed countries and would revolve around “weight 
class, energy source and places where it is allowed to fly” (Morales, Paez and Arangos 2015).  They 
stated that their maximum values would be in line with French and Canadian regulations such as a 9 km 
restriction zone prohibiting UAVs from airspace surrounding airports, flying no closer than 150 m from 
people and reduced weight limits of under 2 kg not requiring operation certificates. 
Similar weight and flying height approaches have been implemented in Europe.  The 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) regulates civil aviation in the European Union (EU).  
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) was tasked by ICAO to implement UAV regulations 
throughout the EU.  UAVs in excess of 150 kg are treated the same as manned aircraft and prior to 2020 
UAVs below 150 kg are regulated by the individual nations within the EU (EASA 2017).  Herrmann 
(2017) states that although each member state has introduced regulations it is not consistent from nation 
to nation with approvals granted in one country not recognised in another. 
Stöcker et al. (2017) conducted the most comprehensive evaluation to date, reviewing the UAV 
regulations of nineteen countries and found that of the nations that have implemented regulations, most 
are bound by national legislation and concentrate on three main areas: 
1. Identifying the need to regulate the airspace used by UAVs to reduce the danger to manned 
aircraft. 
2. Defining operational limits on flights to ensure flights are appropriate (limiting height, weight). 
3. Implementing licensing procedures to regulate flight permissions and data acquisition. 
However, as per Figure 2, in 2016 only one third of countries had some form of UAV regulation 
with almost half detailing no information regarding UAV use for civilian purposes (Stöcker et al. 2017). 
 
Figure 2: Global UAV Regulations in 2016 (Stöcker et al. 2017, p. 7) 
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Stöcker et al. (2017) further explains that from a national context, a detailed analysis “reveals a 
clear heterogeneity of national UAV regulations” siting only two out of twenty-one variables that were 
analysed showed any sign of similarity (being vertical line of sight and lateral distance to pilot), with 
the remaining nineteen variables showing no widespread accordance across all cases. 
Vacca and Onishi (2017) also found that there is a lack of a “single harmonised international 
instrument” with respect to UAV legislation and that pilotless aircraft raise important technical issues. 
Also, UAVs are part of the aviation system that’s integral to improving safety.  ICAOs published 
Circular 328 in 2011 which aimed to inform States about the emergence of UAS policy, was a move in 
the right direction that aimed to provide a “fundamental international regulatory framework through 
Standards and Recommended Practices” (ICAO 2011).  However, prior to 2020 within the European 
Union there is still no common recognition between member states regarding UAV regulations and as 
such there exists a disjoin between national frameworks with respect to weight, and operational and 
altitude limits (Vacca & Onishi 2017). 
Clarke and Moses (2014) put forth that the reason behind this lack of UAV specific regulations 
at an international level could be due to the fact that civilian UAV use was limited in the years after the 
creation of ICAO and that although processes have been implemented to regulate the use of UAVs, the 
organisations “cumbersome” multilateral processes are a significant shortcoming affecting the speed of 
development. 
2.5 PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED 
2.5.1 Privacy 
 Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred 
precincts of private and domestic life and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make 
good the prediction that what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the 
house-tops. 
         (Warren & Brandeis 1890) 
The primary concern with the increase use and development of UAVs is what Finn and Wright 
(2012) describe as the potential for UAVs to infringe on the ethical and privacy rights of people as a 
threat to civil liberties.  Historically, privacy has proven difficult to define with studies outlining 
parameters relating privacy to their area of discipline without a consistent uniform theory being 
produced (Vasalou et al. 2011).  Judge Cooley (1888) defined privacy “as the right to be let alone” 
(Warren & Brandeis 1890) with others following the same vein stating that privacy “is the right that 
protects freedom from surveillance by others” and that individuals, groups or institutions determine what 
information they communicate to others (Westin 1967).  Nelson et al. (2019) uses Floridi’s notions of 
privacy to ascribe tangibility to privacy and define private space as areas “free from sensory interference 
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or intrusion, void of unwarranted interruptions” like sound, touch and sight.  He further states that 
surveillance-based technologies pose one of the largest challenges to privacy due to the uncertainty of 
how they would be used.  It can be easily understood how UAVs could infringe on private space as most 
UAVs have cameras capable of recording sound and vision with the noise from the engines being 
deemed sensory interference. 
Clarke (2014) ties the issue of privacy to UAVs and surveillance through his five dimensions of 
privacy. The five dimensions consist of: 
• privacy of the person.  
• privacy of personal data.  
• privacy of personal behaviour.  
• privacy of personal communication and  
• privacy of personal experience.  
Clarke (2014) 
He attributes behavioural privacy and privacy of personal experience as being the most important 
as they incorporate “the interests that are most directly impinged upon by drone-base surveillance” 
(Clarke 2014).  Finn, Wright and Friedewald (2013) define Clarkes behavioural privacy as protection 
against disclosure of sensitive information such as religious practices, sexual practices or political 
activities.  Clarke (2014) later states that the term “encompasses the individuals’ activities, movements 
and associations”.  Privacy of personal experience is defined by the Queensland Law Reform 
Commission (2018) as the concerns the individual has regarding the collection and storage of data about 
personal experiences including what they “read and view and who they interact and associate with”. 
Clarke (2014) further clarifies that these ‘experiences’ influence a person’s attitudes and opinions and 
skirts the edge of “surveillance of beliefs and thoughts”.  Privacy of personal experience is closely 
aligned with what Finn, Wright and Friedewald (2013) describe as privacy of association which they 
define as the “right to associate with whomever they wish, without being monitored”. 
Warren and Brandeis (1890) comments “the invasion of privacy constitutes a legal injuria and 
elements for demanding redress exist”, however in 2014 The Australian Law Reform Commission 
(ALRC) found that Australia’s privacy regime is fractured and complex.  The State and Territory statutes 
and common law principles applicable to privacy are often out of date with current technology and 
overly complex with significant variation between jurisdictions (ALRC 2014).  It also identifies the 
ability for UAVs to “enter private property, travel unnoticed and record or live stream images and sounds 
which create significant opportunities for privacy breaches” (ALRC 2014).  In 2014 the then Privacy 
Commissioner Timothy Pilgrim was asked how the potential privacy issues relating to UAVs could be 
addressed.  He replied that the question comes down to how it will be regulated and finding the line 
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between regulation that achieves the technological benefits without removing the right of recourse and 
remedy if people’s privacy has been invaded (ALRC 2014).   
The Privacy Act 1988 contains specific Australian laws that regulate the handling of personal 
information.  It contains thirteen principles (see Appendix B) that provide direction applicable to most 
Australian government agencies and private organisations with respect to the collection and 
management of personal information (ALRC 2014).  However, as noted in the 2014 Australian Law 
Reform Commission paper, the Act does not apply to “the collection and use of personal information 
by private citizens nor does it provide overarching privacy protection for the individual”. The Australian 
Information and Privacy Commissioner stated that through community research it was evident that 
people remained concerned for the privacy of their personal information with an increase of 69% of 
Australians being more concerned about their online privacy than five years ago (Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner 2017).  During this research it became apparent that just under 
half of the Australians surveyed were aware of the position of Privacy Commissioner and of the people 
who were aware they appeared to overestimate the reach of the Privacy Act by assuming that that all 
organisations were in fact covered by the Act.  Mistakenly they believed schools, universities and state 
government agencies were covered.  Most States and Territories in Australia have privacy laws but are 
limited in scope much like their Federal counterparts.  Pilgrim (cited in Christianson 2014, p. 36) states 
that these privacy laws generally are only applicable to state and territory government agencies. 
 UAVs have been classified under the Surveillance Devices Act 2004, falling under the definition 
of optical surveillance device or listening device.  In 2014 Australia’s Attorney General Catherine Smith 
however noted that the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 was not written with mobile surveillance systems 
in mind but with its primary focus being devices attached to physical property (cited in Christianson 
2014, p. 37).  State and Territory laws define indecent photography as a criminal offence and prohibit 
observing and filming people in a private place or engaging in a private act.   
However, as an example of the previously mentioned variation amongst State and Territory laws, 
Victoria, Queensland and the Northern Territory permit people to record a private activity without the 
consent of other parties which contravenes the laws of the remaining states. (Australian Law Reform 
Commission 2014). 
The issue of privacy law and the use of UAVs continues to be extensively researched.  However, 
existing laws are either outdated or are lacking in definition and provide remedy only in limited 
circumstances (Clarke 2014).   
2.5.2 Safety  
Sanz et al. (2015) defines safety as “the state in which the system is not in danger or at risk, free 
of injuries or losses”.  This state should be the primary goal if UAVs are to be held in the same regard 
with respect to safety and airworthiness as piloted aircraft. Clothier and Walker (2006) conclude that for 
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routine UAV operations to be integrated into the civilian airspace, UAV developers, operators and 
regulators must prove that the safety of UAVs is at a minimum, equal to conventionally piloted aircraft.  
Others have stated that there are challenges to attaining this standard due to low costs, limited safety 
features and the increasing volume of UAVs that there will inevitably be “low standards of pilot 
performance” and the usual high costs in detection, investigation and defining responsibility (Clarke & 
Moses 2014).   
 
Lack of Operator Knowledge 
Evidence of these challenges can be seen in data produced in 2017 by The Australian Transport 
Safety Bureau (ATSB).  Between 2012 - 2017 of the 154 reported near encounters with UAVs and other 
aircraft, 114 occurred from the beginning of 2016.  This increase in near encounters correlates with the 
increase in UAV licenses.  Others have stated that low standards of pilot performance especially in 
relation to smaller UAVs can be attributed to people being unaware of civil aviation regulations or are 
unfamiliar with the safety risks (The International Air Transport Association 2018).  The ATSB (2017) 
also stated that with most reported near encounters the operators were not following CASR Part 101 
regulations for uncertified UAVs and that it appears that the operators were either unaware or 
unconcerned with the regulations.  In September 2016 a UAV was lost when “during pre-flight 
programming the south-eastern point used to georeference the image on the ground control station map 
was selected to a northern hemisphere latitude which resulted in incorrect way points and home position 
for the mission”.  After an extensive search the Pulse Aerospace Vapor 55 was not found as the UAV 
had commenced tracking towards its home position twelve hundred kilometres away in the Coral Sea 
(ATSB 2016, see Appendix C).  
 
Collision – Aircraft  
Prior to existing regulations both commercial and private UAV flights remained unimpeded and 
were able to fly close to airports, secure facilities and overpopulated areas (Vela, Ferreira & Babin 
2018).  This initial free for all posed a serious threat to safety and security.  In 2018 the Rural and 
Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee (RRATRC) stated that an increasing number of 
ICAO members were becoming concerned with UAVs flying within close proximity to commercial 
aircraft which was proving hazardous to commercial aircraft.  Over half of all incidences involving 
UAVs reported to ATSB were near encounters involving manned aircraft and half of those again 
involved high capacity air transport aircraft (ATSB 2017).  The ATSB (2017) defines a near encounter 
as “when a UAV interrupts or is sighted in the proximity of another aircraft”.  Because there have been 
no actual collisions between UAVs and manned aircraft in Australia, the ATSB has used bird strike data 
to model damage to manned aircraft from collisions with UAVs.  It was found that in 8% of cases, 
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engine ingestion can be expected, and it is likely that when compared with bird ingestion, engine damage 
and engine shutdown is expected to be higher (ATSB 2017).  This increase in damage was explained by 
UAVs being heavier and more ridged than most birds.  Figure 3 demonstrates the increase in reported 
near encounters involving UAVs from 2014-2018. 
 
Figure 3: Proportion of Near Encounters with UAVs by Year (CASA 2018) 
 
 IATA conducted a study in 2018 of five years’ worth of aircraft encounter reports from the 
Global Aviation Data Management database.  The purpose of the study was to identify specific issues 
caused by UAV encounters and 480 reports were analysed. It was reported that manned aircraft 
encounters with UAVs were the top safety risk to the aviation industry (IATA 2018).  They noted that 
the highest number of reports were from the European region accounting for 50% of occurrences and 
that the most frequently reported size of the UAV was greater than one metre wide (IATA 2018).  This 
indicates that due to the size of the UAV involved in the aircraft encounter reports it was most likely not 
a commonly purchased UAV as most recreational UAVs are well under half a metre.  Near collision 
was also the most common aircraft encounter accounting for 80% of the reports (IATA 2018).  Near 
collision is defined as less than three nautical miles separation horizontally and one thousand feet 
vertically between the UAV and the manned aircraft. These near collisions were most likely to happen 
during the initial climb or approach phase of the flight which is commonly referred to as the most 
dangerous time of a flight (IATA 2018). 
 
Collision - Terrain 
 Terrain collisions accounted for 26% of all reported UAV accidents between 2012 and 2017 
with almost half of these events occurring from loss of control of the aircraft (ATSB 2017).  As 
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demonstrated in Figure 4, collision with the terrain had the second highest incident occurrence out of all 
incidents.  Of these accidents 84% resulted in the UAV being significantly damaged or destroyed.  Of 
these terrain collisions the most common UAV mass was 2.9 kg accounting for 19% of occurrences 
(ATSB 2017).  A terrain collision can occur when the operator fails to maintain visual line of sight with 
the UAV and is unable to account for changes in elevation in the terrain or obstacles such as trees and 
buildings. 
 
Figure 4: UAV Accident Occurrence (CASA 2018) 
 
Line of Sight 
Vela, Ferreira & Babin (2018) found that there exists a knowledge gap quantifying the 
definition of visual line of sight (VLOS).  In an analysis of UAV flight operations in different countries 
garnered from public data available online and through social media, the authors found that most of the 
flight distances were 0.5 miles (≈ 805 metres) from their home position.   They suggest that this distance 
is verging on being outside the limits of human perception.  Humans are said to have “normal” vision if 
their binocular acuity measures at 6/6 (20/20).  A person has 20/20 vision when at a distance of 20 feet 
they can correctly identify a letter that is 5 arc minutes in height and any horizontal component of that 
letter at 1 arc minute in width (Curry et al. 2003).   In attempting to define the maximum VLOS Vela, 
Ferreira & Babin (2018) use the idea that people can distinguish horizontal lines in their field of view 
that are 1 arc minute (1/60°) in length and correlate that to a UAV being a single line at distance.  
However, in order to determine the orientation of the UAV the authors suggest that line should be 3 arc 
minutes (3/60°) in length to provide a safety margin.  Using the equation below and the dimensions of 
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a popular brand of recreational UAV that has a width of 350 mm, they calculate that in order to correctly 
distinguish and orientate a UAV by VLOS the permissible distance would be ≈ 401 metres. 
 
𝑤 = 𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝐴𝑉,   𝜃𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 
 
Impact 
The issue of direct physical UAV impact gives rise to potential harm to public safety.  Clark and 
Moses (2014) state there are also the indirect threats where impact can lead to fire or explosion.  Magister 
(2010) correlated UAV design shape and injury biomechanics relating to blunt ballistic impact of UAVs 
and found that the severity of injury in small UAVs (< 15 kg) when operating at minimal airspeed was 
“less than serious” when contacted with a blunt section of the UAV.  He also states that the most 
important finding is that regardless of the mass of the UAV, lethal injury was possible if the impact was 
with a sharper part of the UAV and that a UAV weighing up to four kilograms and travelling at its 
maximum speed (diving straight down) with a diameter of at least thirty centimetres would have an 
Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) value of < 3 (Serious; 8-10% chance of death (CASA 2013).   
 
Figure 5: Abbreviated Injury Scale (CASA 2013) 
 
However, CASA (2013) modelled human injury potential from impacts of small unmanned 
aircraft impacts and used an AIS of 3 as the highest acceptable injury allowed in the study.  They found 
UAV mass and velocity as well as the diameter of the UAV determined how severe the injury would 
be.  They noted that for a 2 kg UAV travelling at 10 m/s for a head impact it would cause a fractured 
skull when impacting with the flat side of the UAV.  In a total loss of control scenario where the UAV 
falls, reaching its terminal velocity, any impact at such high speeds (> 30 m/s) would cause unacceptably 
severe injuries regardless of the weight of the UAV (CASA 2013).  CASA (2013) put forth 
recommendations for UAVs to be designed with large curves with minimal protrusions to minimise 
penetrating injuries and frangible airframes to reduce impact loads.  They recommend the largest 
category of UAV should be 2 kg with a limited airspeed of 7.5 m/s (27 kph). 
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These results provide evidence that with certain design and operational criteria the risk of injury 
could be reduced and possibly the need for certain regulations.  
 
2.5.3 Security 
Loss of Control 
 Impact and collision avoidance can only be achieved when the UAV is under control of the 
pilot.  Loss of control removes the connection between the pilot and the vehicle whilst also removing 
any existing safety implementations.  In 2014 a triathlete received minor injuries whilst competing in 
an event in Geraldton, Western Australia after the pilot of a UAV lost control of the aircraft and it struck 
the athlete (ATSB 2017). The matter was referred to Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions  
which later released a statement saying the radio interference with the race timing equipment was the 
cause of the incident as it had interfered with the operation of the UAV causing the loss of control 
(Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2014).   
CASA (2018) states that a loss of control of a UAV “can be sudden and recovery very difficult 
even for experienced remote pilots”. Research, shown after this list, has identified that loss of control 
over a UAV can happen through the following ways:   
• Hijacking.  
• GNSS jamming and spoofing. 
• Hardware / software malfunction. 
• Electromagnetic interference (high voltage powerlines, cell phone towers). 
• Exceeding the aircrafts limitations (flying to high or out of range). 
• Malicious software. 
• User error. 
 
Shepard, Bhatti & Humphreys (2012) discussed in December 2011 a CIA surveillance drone was 
captured by Iranian forces by jamming the UAVs communication link forcing the UAV into autopilot 
mode which uses predetermined GPS guidance to return to its base in Afghanistan.  The UAV was then 
commandeered by spoofing the UAV with new GPS coordinates causing it to land in Iranian territory.   
Commercial UAVs on the market today are open to hijacking or hacking by electronic interference.  
Skyjack is a UAV created by Samy Kamkar that will find vulnerable UAVs in the air, discover an open 
network and change its Service Set Identifier (SSID) which eliminates any connected users (Arteaga et 
al. 2019).  Kamkar (2015) states that the UAV looks for a wireless signal from drones in the area, 
forcefully disconnects the original wireless connection and authenticates with the target drone which 
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enables him to send commands to it taking control over it.  It can also be run from a laptop from the 
ground.   
Zhi et al. (2019) discusses a hijack method which involves GPS spoofing by broadcasting a false 
location and time with a Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) which leads to control over the 
target UAV.  GPS signals are susceptible to interference (both intentional and unintentional) due to low 
power they have at the earth’s surface (Arteaga et al. 2019) 
Arteaga et al. (2019) have noted that radiofrequency communications purely by design can be 
exploited.  They discuss a process called flooding where an adversary floods the WIFI channel with 
information interrupting the communication on the channel.  This is commonly referred to as Denial of 
Service (DoS).  Zhi et al. (2019) state that the two main methods of communication between the UAV 
and ground controller are radio and WIFI and both have security risks.  They present a method of gaining 
control over a target UAV by finding the target UAV WIFI and monitoring it, launching a de-
authentication attack which kicks the operator off the network, forcing them to reconnect which gives 
the attacker the necessary information to crack the password and take control of the UAV.   
Electromagnetic interference can cause loss of connection.  In 2018 a UAV collided with a cruise 
ship near Fort Hill Wharf Northern Territory when the UAV lost signal.  The UAV operator started 
return home procedures when the UAV deviated from its path and collided with the ship and was 
destroyed.  It was the operator’s opinion that cruise ship had caused “interference with the datalink 
signal” which resulted in the collision (ATSB 2018). 
Well known UAV brands have had to increase the security of their products through user updates.  
A popular brand of UAV maker had to remove third party plug-ins for Android platforms as it was found 
that the application was sending information to the applications server about the user’s device 
information as well as personal information (Zhi et al. 2019).   
Maldrone is software that creates a backdoor in a victim’s UAV software and waits for a reverse 
TCP connection which once received allows an attacker to gain control over the infected UAV (Arteaga 
et al. 2019). 
 
Anonymity 
UAVs can be purchased and flown anonymously.  A person can purchase a UAV off the shelf and 
fly it without the need to register it.  This creates security problems as it is difficult to track and identify 
an offending UAV pilot that breaks the law. One possible way to avoid this issue is to incorporate a 
subscriber identity module (SIM card) within the hardware of the UAV.  This would mean the purchaser 
would register the SIM with a telecommunication company which would then register their details 
against the SIM card.  When the UAV pilot operates their UAV, it would connect with the nearest cell 
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tower, thus providing a record and traceability of the UAV movements, flying time and other tracking 
data, much like a mobile phone.  
Automatic Dependant Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) transponders are used on aircraft and 
obtain their position via GNSS.  This position is then broadcast to control towers and other aircraft which 
helps maintain safe self-separation while in the air.  A leading drone manufacturer is installing ADS-B 
receivers in all drones above 250 grams (DJI 2019).  Another parts manufacturer has developed an ADS-
B beacon 50 mm x 50 mm and weighing 50 grams.  This allows it to be placed on smaller UAVs allowing 
their position to be tracked (uAvionix 2019). 
2.5.4 Public Nuisance 
Noise 
 Queensland’s Environmental Protection Act provides guidelines regarding requirements for 
activities with noise impacts (1994).  The Act identifies noise as a form of contaminant and that noise 
nuisance can cause environmental harm.  Noise causing environmental harm/nuisance negatively affects 
human health and wellbeing by interfering with recreational activities, sleep and relaxation 
(Environment Protection Act 1994 (Qld)). The Queensland Environmental Protection (Noise) Policy 
(2008) gives acoustic quality objectives (see Appendix D) at different places such as dwellings, libraries, 
childcare centres and hospitals.  These quality objectives are designed to protect the environmental 
amenity, health and wellbeing of people at those places.  An example of the objective values are as 
follows: 
• The LAeq,adj,1hr for a dwelling (measured outdoors) at daytime and evening is 50 db 
• The LAeq,adj,1hr for a dwelling (measured indoors) at daytime and evening is 35 db 
• The LAeq,adj,1hr for a school or playground during playtime hours is 55 db 
(Environment Protection Policy (Qld) 2008) 
UAVs are not quiet in their operation.  A NASA study by Christian & Cabell (2017) performed a 
psychoacoustic test on participants by comparing the sound generated by UAVs to the sound generated 
by passing road vehicles. Although both sets of sounds were of equivalent decibels it was found that 
there was a “systemic difference between the annoyance response generated by the noise of the UAVs 
and that of the road vehicles” (Christian & Cabell 2017).  The authors also noted that when all other 
parameters were held constant and only UAV height is varied, they found that there was insignificant 
change in annoyance response (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: UAV Annoyance Rating (Christian & Cabell 2017) 
          
Intaratep, Alexander and Devenport (2016) analysed the acoustic properties of a popular brand of 
quadcopter UAV and found that at maximum thrust (i.e. take off) the sound (80 db) was equivalent to a 
freight train passing at fifteen metres away.  The authors note that at this level it would cause annoyance 
in populated areas subject to high drone usage.  This study was performed in an anechoic chamber with 
the microphone placed 0.77m below and 1.30m to the side of the quadcopter.  These distances would 
be considered conservative when compared to real life applications. 
Christiansen et al. (2016) measured the noise level of two multi-rotor UAVs to determine the 
negative impact on UAVs flying over marine animals.  The authors measured both in-air and underwater 
recordings at altitudes of 40 m, 20 m, 10 m, 5 m and with the microphones 3 m above ground and 1 m 
below the water line.  A mean value measured at a height of 10 m for each UAV was 80 and 81 dB re 
20 μPa for the in-air recordings and 95 and 101 dB re 1 μPa for the underwater recordings.  However, 
decibels measured in air do not directly correlate to decibels measured underwater.  Finfer, Leighton 
and White (2007) describe the derivation of a conversion factor of 61.5 dB that allows the transfer from 
underwater dB to air dB.  This conversion factor is composed of two components - a 26 dB correction 
for sound pressure reference quantities and a 35.5 dB correction to incorporate any acoustic impedances 
between the air and water sound propagation media (Katz et al 2010).  Applying this conversion factor 
to the underwater results obtained by Christiansen et al. (2016) reduces the dB readings to 33.5 and 39.5 
dB.  Christiansen et al. (2016) discuss the need for UAVs in certain applications to fly in close proximity 
to marine animals (< 10 m) and found that the in air dB values of UAVs flying at low altitude would 
most likely have a disturbing effect on sea otters and pinnipeds (seals, sea lions and walruses) when they 
were on land or with their heads protruded from the water.  However, the in-water dB readings at 
altitudes of 5 and 10 m were “many orders of magnitude below” what would cause auditory damage to 
marine life (Christiansen et al 2016) 
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Nuisance 
Zwanikken (cited in RRATRC 2018, pp. 68) stated during the 2017 fire season in Victoria there 
were four instances where hobbyist UAV operators had engaged in nuisance behaviour during fire 
suppression activities and standard operating procedure when unauthorised UAVs are flying over 
emergency areas is to ground the aerial fleet (RRATRC 2018).  Manning (cited in RRATRC 2018, pp. 
68) discussed an incident in 2017 where a rescue helicopter had a near miss with a UAV at Burleigh 
Heads, Gold Coast.  These examples of nuisance behaviour from UAV operators adversely affects the 
public safety through the possibility of cessation of emergency operations (RRATRC 2018).   
Pomeroy, O’Conner and Davies (2014) investigated how UAV flights collecting 
photogrammetric data affected Gray and Harbour seals.  They found that flights over both Gray and 
Harbour seals were variable, with individual variation amongst seals of the same species.  Gray seals 
generally changed behaviour from alert to moving at an altitude from 10 – 50 m and a lateral distance 
of 15 – 210 m and the Harbour seals showed little reaction at a 30 m altitude (Pomeroy, O’Conner and 
Davies 2014). 
Nelson et al. (2019) posits that as UAVs become more ubiquitous and people become more 
familiar with them, a decrease in concern for privacy will occur and the issues of UAV-bystander 
interaction will more likely shift towards nuisance rather than privacy. Nelson et al. (2019) goes on to 
state that the focus should be more on creating noise and nuisance ordinances as these would be a 
more effective than focusing on privacy. 
2.5.5 Trespass 
Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee (2018) noted that New South 
Wales farmers had limited legal remedy when they’ve caught UAVs trespassing on their property.  The 
farmers suggested a base penalty rate of $50,000 for the lack of due diligence and potential harm caused 
by UAV operators.  Also discussed by the Committee was the use of geofencing to prevent access to 
private property by limiting the distance the UAV could travel from its pilot thus reducing the risk of 
trespass and privacy infringement. 
New South Wales, South Australian, Tasmanian, Victorian and Western Australian legislation 
states that there is no trespass or nuisance by aircraft flying over property at a reasonable height as long 
as air navigation regulations are adhered to (Stewart 2016). 
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2.6 UAV DEMOGRAPHICS 
2.6.1 UAVs by Country 
Choi-Fitzpatrick (2016) analysed over 15,000 news articles finding 1145 distinct cases of non-
military UAV use and identified six nations that were most commonly mentioned in the articles.  Those 
nations are as follows: 
 
 
Figure 7: Nations Mentioned in Online Articles (Choi-Fitzpatrick 2016) 
 
However, as noted by the authors, this study focused mainly on English language reports that 
would most likely have skewed the results towards English language countries and that this could be the 
reason why China’s percentage is lower than others.  They also noted that with the United States’ large 
number of technology journalists and the size of their consumer market would have disproportionately 
increased their reported drone use Choi-Fitzpatrick (2016).  
From 2016 to 2017 Vela et al. (2018) gathered two years’ worth of UAV trajectory data primarily 
from social media platforms and publicly available information online.  The data equated to 168,000 
real world UAV mapping operations with the aim of determining if operators were adhering to specific 
guidelines such as visual line of sight and altitude restrictions.  Figure 8 details a breakdown of total 
number of flight operations by country showing a significant difference between the country with the 
most flight operations and the preceding countries.  The United States tops out at 38% of total flight 
operations with the next country, Brazil, accounting for 7% of operations.  This large gap between the 
top two countries could be attributed to a similar research methodology implemented by Choi-
Fitzpatrick (2016), most notably utilising online data skewed towards the US. 
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Figure 8: Countries Identified in UAV Discussions Online (Vela et al. 2018)  
 
Vela et al. (2018) presented an opportunity to investigate an alternative method of country 
selection.  Instead of analysing total number of flights, total area surveyed could give a better insight 
into the “quality” of mapping operations.  Larger survey areas require greater planning, more variables 
with respect to survey specifications, more resources and wider expertise.  
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Figure 9: Countries by UAV Survey Area (Vela et al 2018) 
 
Figure 9 shows that of the 24 countries analysed 14 had surveyed a larger area than the United 
States. However, actual figures detailing area was not available preventing further analysis. 
The German Unmanned Aerial Association (GUAA) published a report analysed the German 
UAV market and focused on private and commercial use.  They ranked the largest commercial UAV 
markets worldwide and found that the United States and China were the largest drone markets with 
France, Germany, Great Britain and Australia following respectively (GUAA 2019). 
 
Figure 10: UAV Market Size by Country (GUAA 2019) 
  
 
22 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.6.2 Users and Numbers 
Data available on usage and total number of UAVs was rare and based on estimates at best with 
some articles proving difficult to verify.  The primary sources of information were from research papers, 
publicly available information and data available from government reports.  An alternative approach to 
verify data was to analyse sales data by country, however as most major UAV manufacturers are 
privately held companies this data proved problematic to find.  The difficulty lay with detailing actual 
drone purchases which the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee (2018) 
stated was because a large portion of purchases were over the internet and second-hand sales that were 
difficult to collate.   
Alternative avenues of research were investigated such as focusing on just licensed or registered 
users to obtain a benchmark.  Molina and Campos (2018) tabulated data on certified UAV operators    
within countries of the current European Union (EU) and although some data was available on the 
number of licence holders it was decided that focusing solely on certified/licensed operators would 
exclude countries that have no licensing requirements and therefore limit the analysis. 
 
Figure 11: UAV Operator Numbers by Country (Molina & Campos 2018) 
 
An overview of the estimated numbers of UAVs and recreational/commercial users from the most 
commonly mentioned countries from the previous studies is detailed below.  
Australia - estimated 100,000 and 150,000 UAVs in the country and estimate of 50,000 
recreational users and 1,720 commercial users (CASA 2019). 
Brazil – 34,000 civil UAS registered with 65% being for recreational purposes and 35% for 
commercial, estimated actual total numbers 100,000 (Unmanned Airspace 2018). 
Canada – 337,468 UAVs in Canada 74% recreational and 26% commercial. 12% is the ratio 
between manned aircraft pilots between the US and Canada.  The same ratio was used to compare the 
number of UAVs in the US to estimate the number of UAVs in Canada (Library of Parliament 2017). 
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However, this number was revised down in 2018 to 193,500 estimated UAVs being flown in Canada by 
140,800 operators (Canadian Government Gazette 2018). 
China – 24,407 certificates to fly were administered at the end on 2017, however certification is 
only needed if the UAV weighs over 7 kg (Wangshu 2019).  
European Union - 1-1.5 million leisure UAVs and 10,000 commercial UAVs (SESAR 2016). 
France – 7,471 referenced operators and 13,647 referenced UAVs in December 2018 (French 
Civil Aviation Authority 2018). 
Germany - 500,000 drones in Germany.  455,000 are for private use and 19,000 for commercial 
use.  Over 10,000 employed in the drone industry (German Unmanned Aviation Association 2019).  
India – A rough calculation of 40,000 UAVs, predominately civilian, but including military and 
law enforcement UAVs as well (The Economic Times India 2017).  
Spain – 2,420 certified UAV operators in 2017 (Molina & Campos 2018). 
United Kingdom - CAA estimated that during 2018 there would be 170,000 registered drone 
operators.  These estimates were based on registrations in other countries such as the US and Ireland. 
(CAA 2019). There were 5,383 registered commercial UAV operators as of September 2019 (CAA 
2019).  
United States - 900,000 registered owners and 1.25 million estimated UAVs (FAA 2018). 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
A thorough search of the literature established that globally there is marginal consensus amongst 
UAV regulations. Research identified five challenges affecting the use of UAVs and although prior 
investigations had uncovered privacy, safety, and security as being the most probable issues affecting 
the use of UAVs, public nuisance and trespass proved equally concerning.   Key UAV demographics 
were identified such as types of users and user numbers, but reliable research that was not based on 
estimates and forecasts proved difficult to find.
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Information obtained in the literature review identified problems associated with UAV use and 
the current level of UAV regulations employed by certain countries.  To achieve the project objectives 
this chapter will define a process for selecting five countries for analysis, develop criteria from the 
identified problems and issues found in the literature review and detail a process for examining how 
existing regulations compare against the prescribed issues using the developed criteria.   
3.2 COUNTRY SELECTION 
The purpose of this section is to outline the method of how the countries that will be included in 
the comparison will be selected.  Two questions were used to define the selection process: 
1. Does the country have a significant UAV user base? 
2. Is there an effective contemporary regulatory system in place governing the use of UAVs? 
The first question seeks to define the number of users and ascertain if there is a strong user base. 
The premise behind this question is that if a country has a large number of users then through a natural 
evolution the regulations should be more comprehensive and robust as there would be a greater 
opportunity for issues and problems to present themselves.     
The second question will ensure that any comparison performed against the criteria will be 
completed on regulations that are current and up to date with changes in technology and how UAVs are 
used commercially and for recreation.  Consequently, greater consideration will be given to countries 
that are in the process of amending or transitioning to new regulations.     
3.2.1 Users 
Research was conducted to gain information on UAV use and numbers.  The results were 
documented in the literature review which have been summarised below.  Primary sources of 
information were government publications, research papers and open source data online.  However open 
source data that was difficult to verify will be precluded from the comparison and is shown below for 
completeness.  Three research segments were identified to direct how the user base will be determined.  
These were: 
• Countries that were acknowledged in prior research and market analyses  
• Estimated numbers of UAVs 
• Estimated users including reported licensed or certified operators  
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Prior Research/Market Analysis   
Limited research was available that could be directly attributed to total number of UAVs per 
country.  Complete market analyses were available but were fiscally prohibitive to obtain and mostly 
focused on market forecasts instead of real data. 
Figure 12 below provides a summary of the countries most often identified from the research in 
the literature review.  Their respective authors are located at the top of the columns with the countries 
following in from most to least identified.   
 
Figure 12: Countries Most Mentioned in the Literature Review 
 
From the figure above it can be seen that Australia, Canada and the United States were mentioned 
across the three research papers with China and the United Kingdom mentioned twice. The United States 
had the largest market size, was the most active country online and had the most documented flight 
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Estimated Numbers of UAVs 
 
Figure 13: Estimated Numbers of UAVs from the Literature Review 
 
The European Union, the United States, Germany, Canada, China and Australia had the largest 
documented numbers of UAVs reported.   
License / Certified / Other Operators 
 
Figure 14: Estimated Numbers of Licenced Operators from the Literature Review 
 
The United States had the highest number of users by far, followed by the United Kingdom and 
Canada.  Of the countries mentioned in the table above Australia, Canada, Germany, the United 
Kingdom and the United States had data available from government sources.  The remaining countries 
were sourced from open source data online where available. 
 
28 Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.2.2 Current Regulations 
Regulations for the countries identified in the usage analysis were then researched.  The primary 
source of information for the regulations was the respective government bodies which were available 
online.  These regulations were collated by year of inception and regulations that had not been amended 
or revised in the last three years would be excluded from the analysis. This ensured that comparisons 
were performed against regulations that were attempting to address recent developments in technology 
and user requirements.  The new European regulations will be included in the comparison because no 
other regulation will encompass such a wide variety of jurisdictions and large population base.  
3.2.3 Countries 
For the purposes of further analysis, the following countries were selected for the criteria 
comparison with the reasons outlined.  
Australia – Large numbers of UAVs with large user base.  Recently update regulations. 
Canada - Large numbers of UAVs with large user base.  Recently update regulations. 
European Union – Currently in regulatory transition, encompasses large population and numerous 
jurisdictions. 
United Kingdom – Large numbers of UAVs with large user base.  Recently update regulations. 
United States – The largest market of UAV operators with recently updated regulations. 
3.3 EXISTING REGULATIONS 
3.3.1 Australia 
In the beginning of 2002 Australia introduce regulations making them the first country to regulate 
UAVs (Buchannan 2019).  The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) is the principal government 
body charged with regulating the flying of UAVs in Australia.  The legislative instrument used to 
regulate the flying of UAVs is the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations Part 101 (Unmanned Aircraft and 
Rockets) Manual of Standards 2019.  This was registered in April 2019.  The information below provides 
a brief summary of the regulations applicable to recreation and commercial users.  This information was 
sourced from CASA. 
 Recreational users follow what’s officially known as “standard operating conditions” which are 
designed to protect the operator and the people around them.  They include only flying one UAV at a 
time and only flying within visual line of sight (VLOS).  Flights must remain under 120 m (400 ft) above 
ground level and no closer than 30 m to people and not over or above people at any time.  Operators 
must not fly near emergency situations, in prohibited or restricted airspace and no closer than 5.5 km to 
a controlled aerodrome or airfield.  Recreational UAVs are limited to a maximum weight of 2 kg. 
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Commercial users operating UAVs under 2 kg can operate under an excluded category provided 
they adhere to the standard operating conditions, apply for an aviation reference number and notify 
CASA prior to completing the flight.   
Commercial users operating UAVs over 2 kg must have a remote pilot licence (RePL) and a 
remotely piloted aircraft operator’s certificate (ReOC) or be working for a ReOC holder.  ReOC’s and 
RePL’s enable pilots to fly outside the standard operating conditions, such as: 
Flying closer than 30 m to people  
• Closer than 30 m but not closer than 15 m providing that the UAV has dual parallel 
redundant battery system with duplicated battery mounting and able to fly with one 
motor inoperative at the maximum take-off weight (MTOW). Return Home functions 
must be operational with at least 7 GNSS satellites. A risk assessment must be performed 
with all identified risks appropriately mitigated and consent from all people located 
within 30 m of the UAV.  Written consent is preferred but not mandatory.  
Area Approvals and Permissions 
• Flying 120 m above ground level in or within 5.5 km of a controlled and non-controlled 
airspace.   
• Flying over or within 5.5 km of a controlled and non-controlled aerodrome or movement 
area. 
Extended Visual Line of Sight (EVLOS) 
• A risk assessment must be performed with all identified risks appropriately mitigated 
prior to application.  All areas of the operational area must always be under supervision 
from an observer.  Either the pilot or an observer must always have direct visual line of 
sight to the UAV.  Both pilot an observer needs CASA approval to conduct EVLOS. 
 Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) 
• A risk assessment must be performed with all identified risks appropriately mitigated 
prior to application.  All flights must be conducted to the same level of safety as manned 
flights focusing on aircraft controllability, fail-safe mechanisms, collision avoidance and 
navigational and height accuracy.  The UAV must be equipped with position lights, anti-
collision/strobe lights and landing lights, transponders such as an ADS-B unit, navigation 
equipment and aeronautical radio. 
 
30 Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.3.2 Canada  
Transport Canada is responsible for the development of aviation regulations in Canada. In the 
beginning of 2019 Transport Canada published updated regulations for flying UAVs with the new 
regulations apply to UAVs that weigh from 0.25 kg to 25 kg and that are operated within the pilots 
VLOS.    All UAVs must be registered and marked with a registration number and all pilots are required 
to pass an online exam to be awarded a pilot certificate in their operational category of choice. Two 
operational categories were introduced – basic and advanced.  Commercial and recreational pilots are 
not treated differently and what defines which category is weight, distance from bystanders and the 
airspace rules for the area the UAV will be flown (Transport Canada 2019).  The information below 
provides a brief summary of the regulations applicable to recreation and commercial users.  This 
information was sourced from Transport Canada. 
Basic 
• Must be over the age of 14 or under supervision of a person who is. 
• Holds a “basic” pilot certificate. 
• Fly in uncontrolled airspace. 
• Fly more than 30 m horizontally from bystanders. 
• Don’t fly over bystanders. 
 
Advanced 
• Must be over 16 years of age or under supervision of a person who is. 
• Holds an “advanced” pilot certificate. 
• Fly within controlled airspace. 
• Fly over bystanders. 
• Fly closer than 30 m to bystanders but not less than 5 m, 
Any flights that deviate from the basic category automatically fall under the advanced category.  
Additional rules apply to the advanced category depending on which condition won’t be met, such as 
seeking permission from air traffic control to fly in controlled. 
Standard guidelines such as flying within VLOS, below 122 m and no closer than 30 m apply to 
all flights.  As well as avoiding emergency operations (bushfires) and advertised events (parades) and 
5.6 km from airports and 1.9 km from heliports as well as far away from other aircraft such as other 
UAVs, helicopters and airplanes. 
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UAVs that weigh under 0.25 kg do not fall under the new guidelines however they must fly within 
VLOS and always fly responsibly.  UAVs that weigh more than 25 kg must obtain special permission 
from Transport Canada and apply for a Special Flight Operations Certificate (SFOC).   
A SFOC is also required for: 
• Flights BVLOS. 
• Flights by a foreign operator or a pilot authorised to fly UAVs by a foreign state. 
• Flights above 122 m. 
• Operating more than five UAVs from a single control station. 
• Flying over an advertised event. 
• Transporting payloads. 
Transport Canada provides privacy guidelines for both recreational and commercial UAV users.  
Recreational users are advised to follow five privacy principles: 
1. Be accountable – the pilot is responsible for all personal information collected during flights. 
2. Limit collection – take steps to avoid blanket collection of information and only record data that 
is needed.  Anonymising data such as blurring faces and number plates is suggested. 
3. Obtain consent – take all reasonable steps to obtain consent from people who will be 
incorporated into the capture area. 
4. Store information securely – Prohibit access to data that may contain personal information. 
5. Be open and responsive about your activities – Respect the rights of others especially if people 
complain that flights are infringing on their privacy. 
(Transport Canada 2019) 
Commercial users, like all other businesses in Canada, are bound by the Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).  Consent must be obtained when collecting, using 
and sharing personal information and for that consent to be valid people must comprehend the 
consequences of consenting to the collection of personal information.  The Privacy Commissioner for 
Canada outlines an additional 5 steps on top of the principles guiding recreational users.  They are: 
6. Identify the purpose of the data collection. 
7. Data collected must only be used for the purpose it was collected. 
8. Personal information collected must be accurate, complete and up to date. 
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9. Individuals must be informed of the use and disclosure of their personal information and have 
the right to access the information. 
10. The privacy principles of the organisation can be challenged by an individual ensuring 
compliance. 
(Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada 2019) 
3.3.3 Europe 
In June 2019 the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) published preliminary UAV 
regulations that are applicable across all member states of the European Union.  At the time of writing 
two primary acts contain the regulations – The Implementing Act and The Delegated Act.  These acts 
were in force at the end of June 2019 but will only be applicable from June 2020. The aim of 
implementing new regulations was to enable free movement of UAV operators across borders and to 
ensure UAV flights are safe and secure.  Previously operators were bound by different regulations from 
all the member nations and these regulations could differ radically.  
Recreational and commercial users are now viewed similarly with the main intention being a risk-
based approach.  Three new categories are introduced – open (low risk), specific (medium risk) and 
certified (high risk).  The certified category relates to larger UAVs that fly in controlled airspace and 
will require the pilot to be licensed, the UAV to have an airworthy certificate and safety controlled by 
the National Aviation Authority.  The open category is considered to cover 90% of recreational and 
commercial flights.  It has three subcategories A1, A2 and A3 and depending on the operational limits, 
requirements of the pilot and technical requirements for the UAV, these will decide which subcategory 
the operation falls under. The open category does not need prior authorisation for flights and there is no 
requirement for a pilot’s license, however online training and examination is necessary for some of the 
subcategories depending on operational requirements.   
The general provisions for the open category are flights cannot go above 120 m and when flying 
within a horizontal distance of 50 m from a manmade structure greater than 105 m in height then the 
maximum height can be increased by a further 15 m at the request of the person responsible for the 
structure.  The minimum age for the open and specific categories is 16 years, however there is no age 
restriction if flying a toy UAV with a MTOW less than 250 g and operating under the supervision of 
remote pilot.  Additionally, from 2022 UAVs will be required to have CE or product regulation 
markings/labelling which will detail the technical specifications of the aircraft.  The labels will include 
information such as: 
• MTOW 
• Maximum speed 
• Maximum height attainable 
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• Electrical voltage 
• Geo awareness systems allowing airspace and altitude restrictions to be uploaded with 
appropriate warning systems in place alerting when nearing those restrictions. 
There are four categories of CE markings (C0 - C4) with each marking indicating a larger, heavier, 
more technical UAV.  The purpose of these markings is to help identify which subcategory the operator 
will fly in. 
The information below provides a brief summary of the regulations applicable to both recreational 
and commercial users.  This information was sourced from EASA. 
Open – A1 
• Never fly over groups of people.  
• Flying over bystanders is allowed if flying C0 rated UAV. 
• Flying over bystanders is only allowed if flying C1 rated UAV and fly over time is as 
short as possible. 
• Flying a C1 rated UAV requires online training and examination. 
Open – A2 (Only applies when operating a C2 rated UAV) 
• Don’t fly over people or crowds. 
• Don’t fly closer than 5 m to people and only if active low speed function is activated, 
otherwise stay back 30 m. 
• Pilot must hold a certificate of remote pilot competency, completed online training 
course, self-practical training and pass theoretical exam. 
Open – A3 (Only applies when operating a C2, C3 or C4 rated UAV or a self-built UAV) 
• Only fly where the operator reasonably expects no bystander will be put in danger during 
the flight. 
• Don’t fly closer than 150 m from residential, commercial, industrial or recreational areas. 
•  Same pilot competencies regarding certificate and training as Open – A2. 
Specific Category 
All flights operating outside the general provisions of the open category fall under the specific 
category as they are deemed to have an increased risk.  If a standard scenario is not available for the 
intended operation, then a risk assessment needs to be provided to authorities using a specified 
methodology.  Standard scenarios relate to particular flight operations and have had predetermined 
safety objectives and mitigation steps established by EASA.  The advantage of these pre-package risk 
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assessments is that it reduces the burden on the operator and the official assessing the application. An 
example of a standard scenario would be flying BVLOS above 120 m over sparsely populated areas.    
In October 2019 EASA is expected to release the Publication of Guidance Material as well as the 
first set of standard scenarios.  This release will detail more information about flights in the specific 
category. 
3.3.4 United Kingdom 
The Civil Aviation Act and the Air Navigation Order 2016 (ANO) are the principal pieces of 
legislation governing the use of UAVs in the UK. The regulations have been updated to allow for a 
simpler set of rules to apply to all UAVs that weigh 20 kg or less which under the legislation are viewed 
as small unmanned aircraft (SUA).  UAVs that have a mass greater than 20 kg are not deemed to be 
SUA and must comply with all the requirements of the ANO such as licensed flight crew, airworthiness 
certificates and permits to fly.  Recreational and commercial operators follow different permissions and 
exemptions.   Exemptions allow for exceptions to the law whilst permissions are used when the law 
prevents the activity but has enabled the possibility within the law to for that activity to take place.  The 
information below provides a brief summary of the regulations applicable to recreation and commercial 
users.  This information was sourced from the Civil Aviation Authority. 
Recreational Operators 
• Responsibility falls on the pilot to ensure all flights are performed in a safe and 
responsible manner. 
• Flying UAVs over 0.25 kg require passing a test and registering the UAV with the CAA. 
• The UAV must always be within VLOS.  
• Flights must remain under 400 ft (122 m). 
• Flights remain clear of flight restriction zones of protected aerodromes such as depicted 
below. 
 
Figure 15: Flight Restriction Rules for Airports and Airfields (CAA 2019) 
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• Additional restrictions apply if flying a UAV weighing more than 7 kg in certain types of 
airspace. 
If the UAV is fitted with equipment capable of performing surveillance or capturing data, such as 
a camera, then it is classed as a small unmanned surveillance aircraft (SUSA) and must adhere to 
additional regulations. 
• Flights must remain 150 ft (50 m) from people, vessels, vehicles and structures. 
• Flights must remain 500 ft (150 m) from congested areas (areas that are used for 
residential, commercial, industrial or recreational and built up areas). 
• Flights must remain 500 ft (150 m) from open-air assemblies of more than 1,000 from 
any person. 
• During take-off and landing the SUSA must remain 30 m from any person. 
To operate beyond the regulations the CAA allows for permissions and exemptions to be granted.  
There is a general exemption in place to allow for first person view flying (FPV).  Ordinarily the headset 
would obstruct the operator’s field of view to the UAV and therefore violate the VLOS rule.  However, 
CAA has given an exemption to this rule providing the operator follows the remaining rules and is 
accompanied by a competent observer. 
Commercial Operators 
• Any commercial operation using UAVs must have a Permission issued by the CAA. 
• Operators must have appropriate insurance coverage which is a condition of all 
exemptions and permissions granted by CAA. 
• Commercial operators must adhere to the same regulations as recreational operators. 
• Permissions are required from the CAA to fly outside the standard.  
• A ‘Standard Permission’ enables commercial flight over or within 150 m of congested 
areas provided the pilot submits an operations manual, evidence of competency and proof 
of insurance cover. 
• Reduced distance permissions allow UAVs to fly within 50 m of people within a 
congested area and less than 150 m from open air assemblies.  
• Flights above 400 ft require operators to submit a risk assessment demonstrating the flight 
will be performed safely. 
• BVLOS / EVLOS and UAVs over 20 kg require exemptions and pilots must submit a 
safety case with risk assessment proving flights will be conducted safely. 
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• BVLOS flights require the aircraft to have onboard collision avoidance equivalent to 
manned aircraft such as a detect and avoid capability and a block of airspace enabling the 
UAV to be segregated from other aircraft. 
• The collection of images of recognizable people are subject to the General Data 
Protection Regulation and the Data Protection ACT 2018. 
3.3.5 United States 
The Federal Aviation Administration is an agency of the U.S. Department of Transportation 
which is charged with the regulation of all civil aviation. The Federal Aviation Administration 
Reauthorisation Act of 2018 was signed in October 2018 and establishes changes for the safe integration 
and use of UAVs including new rules regarding recreational use of UAVs.  Section 349 of said act lays 
out the regulations pertaining to recreational operators as follows: 
• The aircraft must be flown for recreation purposes only. 
• The aircraft must weigh less than 55 pounds (25 kg). 
• The aircraft is operated within the safety guidelines of a community-based organisation 
(CBO) which were codeveloped with the FAA. 
• VLOS must be maintained at all times. 
• Flights must not enter prohibited airspace or fly near other aircraft. 
• Operators must not fly over groups of people, public events or stadiums. 
• Flights must not fly near emergencies such as brushfires and law enforcement activities. 
• Flights close or within airspace at or near airports must comply with airspace restrictions 
and prohibitions and must have prior authorisation from an administrator. 
• In uncontrolled airspace flights must be below 400 ft. 
• The aircraft must be registered with registration number marked on the outside of the 
aircraft by engraving, permanent label or permanent marker. 
• Operators must pass an aeronautical knowledge and safety test with proof of passing 
carried during flights. 
Commercial Operators can operate UAVs weighing less than 55 pounds under Part 107 of the 
Federal Aviation Regulations.    A brief overview of the rules are as follows: 
• Aircraft must weigh under 55 pounds. 
• Operator must hold a remote pilot airman certificate with a small UAV rating or be 
supervised by someone who has one. 
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• UAVs must be registered and marked as per recreational rules. 
• VLOS maintained at all times either by the pilot or by an observer and the aircraft must 
remain close enough to the pilot/operator to be seen with the naked eye. 
• Aircraft must not operate over bystanders. 
• Daylight operations only. 
• Maximum ground speed of 100 mph (160 km/h). 
• FPV can be used if see and avoid requirements are met in other ways. 
• Maximum altitude of 400 ft above ground level. 
• External payloads are allowed provided it is securely attached and aircraft airworthiness 
is not unfavourably affected. 
Waivers are documents issued by the FAA which allows flight operations that deviate from the 
standard regulations.  Waivers provide an opportunity for pilots to, for example, fly at night, fly over 
people and fly BVLOS.  Appendix E provides an example of the information expected when filling out 
a waiver with respect to flying over people. 
 
3.4 CRITERIA  
The literature review identified privacy, safety, security, public nuisance and trespass as the 
overarching challenges with UAVs use.  Privacy proved to be one of the most researched issues with 
the primary concern being the ability for UAVs to infringe on people’s privacy rights.  Although no 
author outlined guidelines allowing for the practical avoidance of privacy infringement, details could be 
inferred from the inherent nature for UAVs to “enter private property, travel unnoticed and record or 
live stream images and sounds create significant opportunities for privacy breaches” (ALRC 2014).   
Research surrounding UAV safety of course proved to be munificent in highlighting numerous 
challenges to UAV flight.  Lack of operator knowledge was demonstrated to be the primary cause of 
most reported near encounters with the risk of collision being the consequence of this lack of knowledge 
with over half of near encounters involving UAVs.  Researchers established that visual line of sight was 
difficult to quantify and demonstrated a formula enabling maximum VLOS to be determined using the 
width of the UAV whilst being predicated on perfect vision in perfect visibility.  Impact could be tied 
in with collision but was separated as research was primarily focused on UAV design and specifications 
such as weight and flight speed instead of operator interference.   
Security issues were at the forefront of the research with terrorism and loss of control being of 
primary concerns.  There are numerous ways an operator can lose control of a UAV with user error and 
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pushing the aircraft beyond its operational limits being most likely, whilst others can be put down to a 
technologically sophisticated adversary or factors beyond control of the operator.  Anonymity was 
discussed with the main risk being UAVs purchased and flown without the need for registration. 
However major manufacturers are stepping in with hardware developments such as ADS-B beacons 
being installed on UAVs above a certain weight class and now most manufacturers require registration 
prior to first flight. 
Regarding public nuisance, UAV noise was a cause for concern with research stating that decibel 
readings taken close to the UAV were equivalent to a freight train passing 15 m away.  NASA concluded 
that UAVs were between slightly and moderately annoying even up to 100 m away.  Nuisance behaviour 
created the greatest problems causing the cessation of emergency operations when UAV operators were 
flying within proximity to water bombers during firefighting operations or near rescue helicopters 
hindering rescues. 
It was noted that with trespass NSW farmers had little legal remedy when UAVs were caught 
operating over their land and that (RRATRC 2018) 
The following criteria (see Appendix F for additional copy), were developed from the issues 
identified during the literature review.  The purpose of the criteria below is to interrogate the regulations 
and determine if and how they are addressing those issues.  
1. Privacy  
a. The regulations shall address the privacy concerns of the general public or provide 
guidelines to reduce the risk of infringing on a person’s right to privacy. 
2. Safety  
a. Operators shall possess a minimum level of knowledge to operate the UAV in a safe 
manner to reduce the risk of injury to people or property.  Knowledge could be 
demonstrated in the form of an online examination, accreditation or a pilot’s 
certificate. 
b. The regulations will contain guidelines reducing the risk of collision including 
onboard collision sensors and alarms. 
c. Maximum visual line of sight shall be defined as visual confirmation of the UAV with 
the naked eye but not further than 400 m. 
d. The regulations will contain limitations on the design of the UAV and the flight 
parameters reducing the risk of harm to people from direct impact. Weight classes and 
flying speed limitations shall be implemented. 
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3. Security 
a. The regulations have stipulated guidelines including limitations reducing the risk of 
losing control of the UAV. 
b. The regulations have ensured that UAVs and operators are identifiable and have 
reduced the risk of UAVs being flown anonymously. 
4. Public Nuisance 
a. The regulations will implement guidelines addressing the issue of noise pollution from 
the use of UAVs such as a maximum decibel value from an environmental agency or 
placing limitations on flying times and distances. 
b. The regulations have implemented guidelines reducing the risk of nuisance behaviour 
and specifically mention avoiding emergency personnel or by placing limitations on 
flying times and distances. 
5. Trespass 
a. The regulations will implement limitations and guidelines preventing the act of 
trespass. 
3.5 CRITERIA COMPARISON 
The regulations of the selected countries will be directly compared with the developed criteria by 
a simple comparative analysis.  The regulation relevant to each subheading of the designed criteria will 
be assessed against said criteria.   
3.6 CONCLUSION 
Discussed in this chapter was the methodology detailing the process of how the countries were 
selected to have their regulations compared to the developed criteria.  Using user numbers and 
contemporary regulations to define the selection process Australia, Canada, EU, UK and US were 
selected for analysis.  A set of criteria were then developed from the problems and issues discovered in 
the literature review which were centred around the overarching tenets of privacy, safety, security, 
public nuisance and trespass.  These criteria will be compared to the selected countries regulations to 






40 Chapter 4: Results 
Chapter 4: Results 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to present the results of the comparison of the criteria formed from the 
issues identified in literature review and the regulations of the selected countries.  This chapter will 
determine if the regulations are meeting the developed criteria, and if so, highlight how by focusing on 
the differences and similarities between the regulations and the criteria.  
4.2 CRITERIA COMPARISON 
4.2.1 Australia 
Privacy (a) 
CASA (2018 advisory circular) stipulates that it does not consider privacy concerns when issuing 
approvals.  However, it does recommend that operators include privacy provisions in their operations 
manuals.  Recreational users are advised to respect personal privacy and not record or photograph people 
without their consent.  There are no guidelines within the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 Part 
101 Unmanned Aircraft and Rockets detailing how pilots can reduce the risk of privacy infringement. 
Safety (a) Knowledge 
Drone accreditation is needed if pilots are flying for fun (recreational users), flying over their own 
land or flying a UAV weighing less than 2 kg.  Accreditation involves passing an online quiz after 
watching a safety video.   
Commercial users need a remotely piloted aircraft operator’s certificate (ReOC) which is obtained 
by submitting an operations and procedures manual outlining how flights will operate safely and legally.  
Also, a remote pilot’s licence (RePL) is needed to fly outside the drone safety regulations or fly UAVs 
weighing more than 2 kg, operators need to complete theory and practical training provided by CASA 
certified training providers.    
Safety (b) Collision 
There are no guidelines within the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 Part 101 Unmanned 
Aircraft and Rockets stipulating the need for collision sensors or alarms on board UAVs.  There are 
defined operational limits such as maximum flying heights and distances to aerodromes, however,  
collision is only mentioned within the definition of “operated within visual line of sight” which states 
that a person must be able to see the aircraft to maintain the operator’s separation and collision avoidance 
responsibilities.  Advisory Circulars released by CASA provide guidance on how the regulations should 
be interpreted.  Advisory Circular AC 101-01 v2.1 (CASA 2019) states that all UAVs operating in the 
non-excluded (included) category should be painted for maximum visibility including collision 
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avoidance lights such as strobe lights.  Also, if ADS-B transponders are fitted they should meet the 
required standards and be turned on.  
Safety (c) VLOS 
Subpart 101.074 (3) of the regulations provides this definition of VLOS: 
An unmanned aircraft is being operated within the visual line of sight of the 
person operating the aircraft if the person can continually see, orient and 
navigate the aircraft to meet the person’s separation and collision avoidance 
responsibilities, with or without corrective lenses, but without the use of 
binoculars, a telescope or other similar device. 
(CASA 2019) 
The definition provided by CASA gives guidance on how an operator would define the VLOS to 
their aircraft.  It places the onus on the operator to determine the maximum VLOS without providing a 
quantitative value which would reduce the risk of operators flying outside their visual limits.   
Safety (d) Impact 
Recreational users are limited to UAVs that weigh up 2 kg.  Commercial operators are bound by 
the same weight restrictions unless they hold and a remote pilots licence and operate under a remotely 
piloted aircraft operators certificate. 
The regulations provide no speed limitations on UAV flights and there is no mention of design 
parameters that would reduce the risk of harm from direct impact. 
Security (a) Loss of Control 
There are no guidelines within the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 Part 101 Unmanned 
aircraft and rockets specifying procedures on mitigating the risk of losing control of a UAV.  CASAs 
Part 101 (Unmanned Aircraft and Rockets) Manual of Standards 2019 does however give a brief 
overview of procedures for loss of control in an EVLOS flight.  The manual mainly states that the 
operator’s procedures should ensure that the pilot can re-establish control or end the flight without 
causing a hazard to life or property e.g. a controlled flight into terrain.  Advisory Circular AC 101-01 
v2.1 (2018) discusses how losing power can be harmful to people below.  It also details how mission 
plans should have procedures relating to how emergencies like loss of control would be handled by the 
operator and provides examples of how fail-safe devices would reduce the injury to bystanders.  CASA 
also notes that data links between the UAV and the operator should be monitored in real time with 
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Security (b) Anonymity 
At the time of writing, CASA is introducing registration for all UAVs flown for both commercial 
and recreational purposes.  CASA states that the primary purpose of the registration initiative is to ensure 
that people fly their UAVs responsibly and safely.  Apart from the ADS-B requirements for larger UAVs 
no other de-anonymizing requirement was found in the regulations. 
Public Nuisance (a) Noise 
There are no guidelines within the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 Part 101 Unmanned 
aircraft and rockets specifying procedures on reducing the issue of noise pollution generated by UAVs.  
Both Advisory Circular AC 101-01 v2.1 (CASA 2019) and AC 101-10 v1.3 (CASA 2019) state that 
UAV operators are bound by local noise abatement laws.  These include restrictions on altitude, flight 
path and the time of day of flights.  Also, the regulations state that unless additional flight permissions 
are obtained, the operational hours for flying a UAV are during daylight hours as flights must be within 
VLOS.  
Public Nuisance (b) Nuisance behaviour 
Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 Part 101 Unmanned aircraft and rockets specify that 
UAVs must not be flown over an emergency operation or public safety event without the approval of 
the person in charge.  As noted above, the risk of nuisance behaviour at night is reduced as most UAV 
operators can only fly during daylight hours as flights must remain within VLOS. 
Trespass (i) 
There are no guidelines within the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 Part 101 Unmanned 




Although not preserved within the Canadian Aviation Regulations, Transport Canada provides 
clear privacy guidelines for both recreational and commercial UAV users.  Operators are directed to a 
dedicated online resource specifically detailing the privacy guidelines for flying UAVs.  This resource 
discusses that although Canadas privacy regulations do not specifically reference UAVs, the privacy 
laws in Canada do apply to information that could be collected such as video and pictures. 
Recreational users must abide by the previously mentioned five privacy principles, while 
commercial operators are bound by the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
(PIPEDA).  PIPEDA applies to all businesses within Canada and ensures that consent is obtained when 
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collecting personal information and that the information is handled with a high degree of 
professionalism. 
Safety (a) Knowledge 
To be allowed to fly a UAV in Canada with a MTOW between 250 grams and 25 kg, recreational 
and commercial operators must obtain a Pilot Certificate with either basic or advanced endorsement.  
The basic operations certificate consists of 35 multiple choice exam questions delivered online and 
completed in 90 minutes with a 65% score minimum to pass.  Topics include air traffic rules, air law, 
meteorology and navigation.  The advanced operations certificate requires completing an online exam 
consisting of 50 multiple choice questions in 60 minutes with at least an 80% score to pass. 
Safety (b) Collision 
Part IX – Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems - Division III - General Operating and Flight Rules 
specifically mentions the risk of collision and provides procedures and guidelines to reduce its risk.  The 
regulations state that pilots should not increase the risk of collisions by flying in close proximity to other 
aircraft (901.18).   Take-off and landing sites must be suitable for the operation and that there is no risk 
of collision with aircraft, bystanders or obstacles (901.33) and if the risk of collision becomes too great 
then operators must cease any flights immediately (901.49). 
Safety (c) VLOS 
900.01 provides the following definition under the regulation for visual line of sight: 
Visual line-of-sight or VLOS means unaided visual contact at all times with a 
remotely piloted aircraft that is sufficient to be able to maintain control of the 
aircraft, know its location, and be able to scan the airspace in which it is 
operating in order to perform the detect and avoid functions in respect of other 
aircraft or objects.    
No pre-defined distance is given regarding maximum visual line of sight.  The responsibility is 
placed on the pilot to ensure that they believe they have control of the UAV at all times. 
Safety (d) Impact 
The main operating categories being basic and advanced have weight limitations on the types of 
UAVs that can be flown.  UAVs weighing up to 25 kg can be flown providing the operators adhere to 
the regulations under each of those categories.  Drones weighing over 25 kg can be flown but need 
special permission from Transport Canada in the form of a Special Flight Operations Certificate.  
The regulations provide no speed limitations on UAV flights and there is no mention of design 
parameters that would reduce the risk of harm from direct impact. 
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Security (a) Loss of Control 
Loss of control is termed a “fly-away” within the regulations and defined as a loss of the command 
and control link between the operator and the UAV in which the operator is unable to control the UAV.  
Minimal advice can be found within the regulations regarding how an operator would limit the risk of a 
fly-away.  901.23 (1) states that an operator should not pilot a UAV unless they have procedures to 
handle emergencies such as (iv) loss of the command and control link or (v) a fly-away.  Pilots should 
cease operations 901.49 (1)(f) if the UAV becomes uncontrollable. 
Security (b) Anonymity 
All UAVs weighing from 250 grams and up to and including 25 kg need to be registered with 
Transport Canada.  The operators name and address, DOB, purchase date, make, model, serial number, 
weight and type of UAV are recorded against a registration number.  This registration number must be 
marked on the UAV with permanent marker, permanent label or engraving.  There are no other real time 
identification requirements within the regulations.  
Public Nuisance (a) Noise 
There are no guidelines within the Canadian Aviation Regulations addressing the issue of noise 
pollution from the use of UAVs.  Compounding the issue, night flights are permitted as well providing 
the UAV has position lights enabling it to be seen during the night either with or without night vision 
goggles worn by the operator (901.39 (1)).   
Public Nuisance (b) Nuisance Behaviour 
901.12 (1) states that a UAV must not be flown over or within an emergency security perimeter 
established by a public authority responding to an emergency.  As noted above, nuisance behaviour is 
not limited to day light hours as the regulations allow for UAV flights at night as VLOS can be 
established using positioning lights. 
Trespass (a) 
There are no guidelines within the Canadian Aviation Regulations addressing the issue of 
trespass.   
 
4.2.3 European Union 
Privacy (a) 
EASA has established regulations with the aim of addressing the risk of privacy infringement.  
EASA has stated that one of the main aims of the regulations is to mitigate the hazards pertaining to the 
protection of personal data and privacy.   
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Article 14 (5)(a)(ii) of the Commission Implementing Regulation states that if a UAV is capable 
of capturing personal data via a sensor (e.g. camera) attached to the UAV then the operator must be 
registered within a Member State.  Article 18 (m) tasks a competent authority with maintaining a 
registration system for operators whose operations present a risk to privacy and personal data protection.  
Article 12 (1)(c) requires a statement from the operator confirming that the planned operation will 
comply with all EU and national rules in particular, how it will address privacy and data protection.  
Article 15 (1) defines privacy as one of the deciding factors when determining geographical areas where 
UAVs can operate.  Within the Annex of the Implementing Regulation, UAS.OPEN.020 (4)(b) requires 
knowledge regarding privacy and data protection (vii) to be demonstrated via an examination delivered 
by a competent authority. 
These regulations are aimed towards operator awareness and education rather than hard 
guidelines.  Operators must demonstrate knowledge regarding privacy issues and the regulations have 
been constructed with the aim of reducing risk of privacy breeches. 
Safety (a) Knowledge 
All operators wishing to operate UAVs with CE markings from C1 to C4 must pass an online 
exam.  If operators want to fly close to bystanders, an additional theoretical exam must be taken and 
delivered by a recognised entity. 
UAS.OPEN.020 (4)(b), UAS.OPEN.030 (2)(a) and UAS.OPEN.040 (3) state that operations shall 
be performed by remote pilots that have completed an online training course and successfully passed a 
theoretical exam provided by a competent authority.  The aforementioned training course must cover 
the following subjects: 
• air safety 
• airspace restrictions 
• aviation regulations 
• human performance limitations 
• operational procedures 
• general knowledge 
• privacy and data protection 
• insurance 
• security 
UAS.OPEN.030 (2)(b) requires self-guided practical training with an additional theoretical 
examination (c) to be completed covering the following topics: meteorology, flight performance and 
technical and operational mitigations for ground risk.  
Safety (b) Collision 
The only guideline in place within the regulations for reducing the risk of collision was 
UAS.OPEN.060 (2) during the flight the remote pilot shall (b) keep the UAV in VLOS to reduce the 
risk of collision with manned aircraft with the flight being discontinued if there is an increase risk to 
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aircraft, people, animals, environment or property.  Article 7 (3) requires that any UAV operations in 
the certified category must abide by Commission Regulation (EU) No 1332/2011 which define operating 
procedures for airborne collision avoidance. These regulations include the need for airborne collision 
avoidance systems (ACAS) AUR.ACAS.1005 (3) and what to do when the ACAS sounds a collision 
alarm AUR.ACAS.2005 (1) (2). These regulations however only apply to the certified category of flight 
operations which are deemed high risk and form a small portion of total flights.   
Part 2 - 5 of the Commission Delegated Regulations requires all C1, C2, C3 and C4 class UAVs 
to be equipped with a geo-awareness system that allows for uploading and updating airspace limitations, 
warning alerts to the remote pilot of imminent airspace breech detections and also be able to alert the 
operator if the geo-awareness system is not functioning properly.  Part 2 also requires C1, C2 and C3 
UAVs to be equipped with lights with the stated purpose being to aid in controlling the UAV and for 
increased visibility at night to able people to distinguish between manned aircraft and the UAV.   
Safety (c) VLOS 
Article 2 of the Implementing Regulation - Definitions (7) describes VLOS as: 
a type of UAS operation in which, the remote pilot is able to maintain 
continuous unaided visual contact with the unmanned aircraft, allowing the 
remote pilot to control the flight path of the unmanned aircraft in relation to 
other aircraft, people and obstacles for the purpose of avoiding collisions. 
No pre-defined distance is given regarding maximum visual line of sight.  UAS.OPEN.060 (2) 
states that during a flight the pilot shall (b) maintain VLOS and consistently scan the surrounding 
airspace to avoid the risk of collision.   
Safety (d) Impact 
Part 1 of the Commission Delegated Regulations states that for a C0 class UAV (1) the MTOM 
is less than 250 g and (2) a maximum speed of 19 m/s.  A C0 class UAV must also be designed to 
minimise injury to people from impact such as no sharp edges and design limitations on propellers to 
reduce injury from the propeller blades.  Part 2 (1) requires a C1 class UAV (1) to be made from 
materials and have physical and performance specifications that if an impact at its maximum speed 
(terminal velocity) to the human head exerts less than 80 J or has an MTOM of less than 900 g and a 
maximum speed limitation of 19 m/s (2).  Part 3 states that a C2 class UAV (1) must weigh less than 4 
kg and (6) by the nature of its design, limit the injury caused to people from impact by avoiding sharp 
edges and reducing the damage that can be caused from propeller blades.  Part 4 and 5 require class C3 
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Security (a) Loss of Control 
 Parts 1 – 5 of the Commission Delegated Regulations provide guidelines for how UAV 
manufacturers can provide solutions to mitigating the risk of losing control of the UAV unexpectedly.  
The regulations stipulate that for classes C0 – C4 the manufacturer of the UAV must place on the market 
a manual of operations which states how the UAV will behave during a loss of data link.  There is also 
a requirement under each of the classes that when a loss of data link has occurred, there will be a reliable 
and predictable way to recover the data link or the flight will be terminated. 
Security (b) Anonymity 
The Commission Delegated Regulations have provided clear procedures to reduce the possibility 
of operators flying UAVs anonymously.  All UAVs with a MTOM of more than 250 g must have a 
direct remote identification system equipped on the UAV.  Article 2 of the Commission Implementing 
Regulations defines direct remote identification as a system that broadcasts information locally about 
the UAV, such as the operators details and UAV specifications, without the need to physically access 
aircraft.  The Commission Delegated Regulations state that a UAV shall have a direct remote 
identification system that will periodically broadcast from the UAV, in real time during flight, on an 
open transmission protocol that can be received by existing mobile devices in broadcast range, the 
following information: 
• operator registration number 
• unique physical serial number of the UAV 
• the geographical position, height above surface and take off point 
• the route taken by the UAV 
• the geographical position of the UAV 
Public Nuisance (a) Noise 
The Commission Delegated Regulations state that it is important to limit the noise emissions 
generated by UAVs to the greatest possible extent in order to provide the highest level of environmental 
protection.  Part 13 of the regulation provides the Noise Test Code which provides procedures for 
manufacturers to measure the noise generated from their UAVs including microphone placement and 
operating conditions during the test.  Part 15 of the Regulations provides maximum sound power levels 
per class of UAV with those levels reducing over the course of a two and four year period to give 
manufacturers a grace period to adjust their UAV designs.   
The Commission Implementing Regulations UAS.SPEC.050 (1)(a)(v) requires operators to plan 
all flights so as to minimise nuisances including noise to people and animals. Whilst UAS.SPEC.050 
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(1)(i)(iii) specifies that operators should choose a UAV for the operation it is designed for to minimise 
noise and other emissions. 
Public Nuisance (b) Nuisance Behaviour 
The Commission Implementing Regulations UAS.SPEC.060 (3) states that UAV operators must 
not fly close to areas where an emergency situation is ongoing unless they have permission from the 
emergency services.  Nuisance is mentioned throughout the Regulations and is generally coupled with 
noise emissions requiring operators to plan flights to minimise nuisances UAS.SPEC.050 (1)(a)(v). 
Trespass (a) 
Neither the Commission Implementing Regulations or the Commission Delegated Regulations 
provide guidelines regarding UAVs and trespass. 
 
4.2.4 United Kingdom 
Privacy (a) 
The CAA states that its duty is limited to safety and ensuring pilots are operating within the 
confines of their granted permissions.  They state that their responsibility does not include concerns over 
privacy and direct people to the Information Commissioners Office as any privacy issues will not be 
dealt with by the CAA.  However, Air Navigation Order 2016 (ANO2016) provides guidelines for UAV 
operators to avoid privacy issues by clearly delineating between UAVs that have surveillance 
capabilities and UAVs that do not.  The ANO2016 states that small unmanned surveillance aircraft are 
UAVs that are able to perform surveillance and data acquisition.  These aircraft have greater flight 
restrictions placed on them with the regulations defining guidelines such as keeping greater distances 
from people during take-off or landing and increasing the distance when flights are planned over or 
within congested areas and open-air assemblies.  It can be inferred that the purpose for defining UAVs 
with surveillance capabilities and placing tighter flight restrictions on those aircraft, is to reduce the risk 
of the general public being surveilled and having their right to privacy invaded.  
Safety (a) Knowledge 
Currently, recreational users are not required to demonstrate a minimum level of knowledge and 
can fly UAVs legally following the regulations.  However, from November 2019, recreational users will 
have to pass a “drone test” and register with the CAA.   
Civil Aviation Publication (CAP) 722 provides additional guidance on the regulations and 
requires that commercial UAV operators must be able to prove pilot competence in areas such as: 
general airmanship and successfully completing a practical flight assessment under the appropriate 
classification. 
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Safety (b) Collision 
ANO2016 article 94(4) provides guidelines for collision avoidance with manned aircraft by 
restricting flights in certain airspaces involving the aerodrome traffic, close proximity to aerodrome 
boundaries and restricting the flying height of the UAV. 94(3) states that the UAV must be in constant 
unaided visual contact (VLOS) with operators to maintain their collision avoidance responsibilities. 
CAP 722 states sensors and collision alarms forming part of an onboard collision avoidance system of 
a technical ability at least equivalent to manned aircraft specifications are only required on BVLOS 
flights and are not required for recreational and most commercial applications. 
Safety (c) VLOS 
 ANO2016 requires that the UAV must be in constant unaided visual contact (VLOS) with the 
operator to maintain their collision avoidance responsibilities. CAP 722 also defines extended VLOS 
operations as flights that are performed beyond 500 m.  Therefore, it can be construed from the 
regulations that the maximum VLOS before entering into extended VLOS operations is up to 500 m.  
Safety (d) Impact 
Two main operating categories are defined in the regulations, small unmanned aerial vehicle and 
unmanned aerial vehicles.  Small unmanned aerial vehicles are defined under ANO2016 as any 
unmanned aircraft weighing not more than 20 kg without its fuel.   Small UAVs are bound by the 
operating guidelines in ANO2016 whereas UAVs weighing more than 20 kg around subject to the entire 
UK aviation regulations.   
No speed guidelines were found in the regulations or design limitations to reduce the severity of 
the injury to a person from an impact with a UAV. 
Security (a) Loss of Control 
CAP 722 states that UAV operations in both segregated and non-segregated airspace must have 
procedures in place for emergency recovery after a loss of control data link.  Standard operating 
procedures should contain guidelines for loss of data link and abort procedures after a critical system 
failure.  These recommendations are aimed at commercial operators flying in an Air Traffic Service 
area.  No loss of control procedures were found in the regulations for recreational users. 
Security (b) Anonymity 
No procedures were found in the regulations to ensure UAVs and their operators are identifiable 
and unable to fly UAVs anonymously.  CAA proposes to introduce a registration scheme by November 
2019 for all UAVs weighing over 250 g to be required to be registered with the CAA.  The CAA states 
that operators will be registered instead of drones with the registration number of the operator to be 
applied to all UAVs flown by that operator.     
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Public Nuisance (a) Noise 
No guidelines addressing the issue of noise pollution regarding the use of UAVs were found in 
ANO2016.  The CAA states that it does not make decisions regarding whether an amount of noise would 
be annoying or damaging to people. 
Public Nuisance (b) Nuisance Behaviour 
No information was found within ANO2016 regarding nuisance flying such as avoiding 
emergency personnel.  Limitations on how close operators can fly to people are clearly defined in the 
regulations. CAP 722 states that night-time VLOS flights are permitted provided the guidelines for 
VLOS are adhered to.  This criterion however may be satisfied by an alternative Act outside the scope 
of this project.   
Trespass (a) 
CAP 722 requires that operators must be aware of relevant trespass laws when conducting a flight 
and to obtain permission before entering or operating from private property. 
 
4.2.5 United States 
Privacy (a) 
No mention of guidelines addressing privacy concerns was found in Part 107 of the Federal 
Aviation Regulations. Section 357 of FAA Reauthorisation Act 2018 declares an unmanned aircraft 
systems privacy policy which states that: 
It is the policy of the United States that the operation of any unmanned 
aircraft or unmanned aircraft system shall be carried out in a manner that 
respects and protects personal privacy consistent with the United States 
Constitution and Federal, State, and local law. 
The FAA considered including privacy provisions in Part 107 of the Federal Aviation Regulations 
however it stated that “given the FAA’s longstanding mission and authority as a safety agency, it would 
be overreaching for the FAA to enact regulations concerning privacy rights” FAA (2016). 
Safety (a) Knowledge 
No minimum level of knowledge is required under the regulations for recreation users to fly 
UAVs, however the FAA is implementing an aeronautical knowledge and safety test and is current 
developing a training module and exam in consultation with the industry. 
Commercial operators must pass a knowledge test as regulated under Part 107 which includes the 
following subject areas: 
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• Regulations 
• Airspace classifications 
• Meteorology 
• Emergency procedures 
• Maintenance 
• Airport operations 
• Physiological effects of drugs 
and alcohol 
• Communications 
• Decision making and 
judgement 
 
Safety (b) Collision 
Part 107.29 (a) states that UAVs are prohibited to fly at night and (b) can only fly at civil twilight 
if fitted with anti-collision lights which are visible for 3 statute miles.  107.37 (a) requires all small 
unmanned aircraft to yield to all aircraft and that (b) no one should create a collision hazard by flying a 
UAV to close to another aircraft.  107.43 stipulates that UAVs must not interfere with the operations of 
any airports with 107.41 declaring classes of prohibited airspace.  No reference has been made in the 
regulations necessitating collision sensors or collision alarm to be equipped to UAVs. 
Safety (c) VLOS 
107.31 (a) defines VLOS as with vision unaided by any device other than corrective lenses the 
operator of the UAV must be able to see the UAV throughout the entire flight.  No pre-defined distance 
is given regarding maximum visual line of sight. 
Safety (d) Impact 
107.51 (a) limits the ground speed of small UAVs (55 lbs; 25 kg) to 44 m/s.  No design limitations 
to reduce the severity of the injury to a person from an impact with a UAV were present in the 
regulations. 
Security (a) Loss of Control 
No loss of control guidelines were found in the regulations. 107.21 (a) states that during an in-
flight emergency the operator can deviate from any rule necessary to meet the emergency. 
Security (b) Anonymity 
All UAVs flown either recreationally or commercially must be registered and the UAV marked 
with the registration number by engraving, permanent label or permanent marker.  There is no other real 
time, in flight identification requirements within the regulations.  
Public Nuisance (a) Noise 
No guidelines addressing the issue of noise pollution were found in the regulations. 
Public Nuisance (b) Nuisance Behaviour 
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Operators are advised not to fly near emergencies such as accident response, firefighting and 
hurricane recovery. 
Trespass (a) 
There are no guidelines within Part 107 or FAA Reauthorisation Act 2018 addressing the issue of 
UAVs and trespass.   
 
4.3 CONCLUSION 
The result of the comparative analysis performed in this chapter provides a detailed insight into 
how current regulations are addressing the privacy, safety and security concerns of the general public.    
As was expected and noted during the research phase of this project, not all criteria were met by the 
regulations.  This issue will be explored in further detail in the discussion portion of this paper.
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss whether the regulations have met the prescribed criteria developed from 
the literature review in Chapter 2.  The differences and similarities between the regulations and criteria 
will be highlighted and critiqued.  Finally, recommendations will be put forth suggesting how the 
regulatory shortfalls and existing gaps can be addressed therefore meeting the concerns of researchers 
and the general public.  
5.2 PRIVACY 
Whether the regulations addressed the privacy concerns of the general public proved to be a 
complex question.  There was no common theme running through each of the regulations tying into 
what the general public would see as a simple remit, protect a person’s right to privacy.  The regulations 
traversed the full breadth of the issue, from deflecting the issue of privacy to another authority, to 
regulations whose primary aim is to address privacy issues.  Only Canada and the EU have attempted 
to provide guidance for operators to uphold the rights to privacy. 
From the regulations of the five countries that were analysed, all five were administered by safety 
authorities.  Three of the regulators stated that privacy was not part of their responsibilities.  However, 
two of these regulators included privacy provisions in their regulations with one delineating between 
surveillance and non-surveillance UAVs and the other providing a privacy policy.  One of the countries 
provided robust privacy guidelines external to the regulations with detailed information regarding 
operator’s responsibilities and applicable Acts.  Two countries placed restrictions on UAVs that were 
capable of surveillance with only one stating these restrictions were for privacy purposes. 
Australian regulations provide limited guidance on reducing the risk of infringing on people’s 
privacy.  For example, there are no additional limitations placed on UAVs equipped with surveillance 
equipment, no requirement for real time inflight identification of the operator and UAV, and no 
requirement for operators to demonstrate knowledge regarding privacy.  Operators look to the regulator 
seeking guidance on how to navigate the privacy issues but find limited information and are advised 
external to the regulations to respect personal privacy and not record or photograph people without their 
consent.  Newly designed regulations have provided opportune time to address the concerns of the 
general public.  Through consultation with the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, 
privacy guidelines could have been developed that would put them in line with their equivalent safety 
authorities in other countries that have been successful in addressing privacy concerns.   
Canada also provides no privacy guidelines within their regulations.  However, Transport Canada 
has given guidance to recreational users by providing an online resource which details how users can 
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apply privacy principles to the flying of UAVs. Commercial users are directed to the relevant privacy 
information and given a brief description of how they can protect people’s privacy. 
The EU is implementing the most robust and progressive privacy guidelines of any regulator.  
Operator registration is needed for flying UAVs capable of performing surveillance, flight planning 
must take into account privacy concerns and operators must demonstrate knowledge of privacy and data 
protection.  Additionally, operators will be able to be identified in real time during flights, reducing the 
ability for operators to infringe on privacy rights anonymously     
Although the UK’s CAA has stated that its responsibility does not concern privacy, it has 
segregated UAVs that can conduct surveillance from those that cannot and included greater flight 
restrictions distancing UAVs from bystanders.  However, distance does not negate the ability for sensors 
to capture and store private information and data.  The CAA has stated that privacy issues should be 
directed to the Information Commissioners Office or to local police. 
The US provides a privacy policy within its regulations stating that UAV flights should protect 
and respect personal privacy consistent with law, but provides no guidelines directing operators on how 
those flights can stay within those legal boundaries.        
UAVs and privacy ultimately are a multifaceted complex issue that is far beyond the scope of this 
project.  And although the use of UAVs is regulated primarily by safety authorities, no other organisation 
is better positioned to provide guidelines for the protection of privacy as these safety authorities have 
extensive knowledge of the minutia of UAVs and their applications.    
5.3 SAFETY 
All regulations surveyed required operators to have some form of prerequisite knowledge 
demonstrated prior to operating UAVs.  The depth of this knowledge varied greatly however, with some 
regulators only requiring a basic understanding of general safety, while other regulators were expecting 
broader knowledge on topics such as meteorology, navigation and air law. 
All regulations in the comparison had limitations in place on how close UAVs can be flown to 
aerodromes with the intention on reducing the risk of collision.  Equally, height restrictions were in 
place limiting the risk of UAV incursion into regulated airspace and therefore collision as well.  
Regarding the implementation of collision sensors and alarms including broadcast beacons, this was 
only a requirement on larger UAVs above certain weight / size class or operations performed BVLOS 
for all regulations.   
All regulations analysed included a clear definition of VLOS based on continuous unaided visual 
contact with the UAV at all times.  However, within their definitions, no regulator has set a maximum 
distance that operations can be performed and still be within VLOS.  The regulators have put the onus 
onto the operators to use their best judgement without providing a best-case scenario distance limitation.  
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The UK regulations came close to defining a limit stating that EVLOS is either within or beyond 500 
m.  Considering that within most regulations the transition of line of sight is VLOS – EVLOS – BVLOS, 
then under the UK regulations it would then be assumed that the boundary between VLOS and EVLOS 
is 500 m. 
All regulations included in the analysis had weight class restrictions.  Once again, these weight 
classes varied throughout the regulations with some regulators limiting users to UAVs with a maximum 
weight of 2 kg, whilst a majority of the regulations allowing up to 20 – 25 kg.  Australia and the EU 
focused on keeping UAV weight classes low with Australia limiting UAVs to 2 kg without the need for 
a licene and certification whilst the EU requires UAVs weighing up to 2 kg to keep 50 m clear of people 
and a 150 m for UAVs weighing more up to 25 kg.   The regulations of the remaining countries allow 
UAVs up to 20 - 25 kg which increases the risk of injury and falls outside the recommended weights 
stated in the research.  
UAV speed was only regulated in two countries, the US and the EU.  The US regulations have 
limited all small UAVs (< 25 kg) to 44 m/s and the EU have stated that C0 class under 250 g and C1 
class under 900 g must be kept under 19 m/s. These speeds are outside the recommendations put forth 
by researchers. The EU regulators have set specific design constraints for each class of UAV.  The 
design specifications cover maximum energy levels when impacting the human body and travelling at 
maximum speed.  No sharp edges are permitted on the UAV and propeller blades must be designed to 
limit injury.  No other regulations analysed have applied limitations to UAV design apart from weight 
restrictions. 
5.4 SECURITY 
No regulator provided guidelines on preventing the loss of the control of the UAV during a flight 
within their regulations.  The responsibility was predominantly placed on the operator to develop 
detailed protocols to be included in their standard operating procedures.   
All regulators require either the operator or the UAV to be registered with a competent authority 
allowing for the possible identification of the operator or UAV.  The EU goes even further and requires 
all UAVs weighing greater than 250 g to have a direct remote identification system onboard that will 
allow the operators details, geographical location of the UAV and operator and the route taken during 
the flight, to be accessible by a mobile device without the need to access the UAV.  This system is 
considerable step forward in eliminating the possibility of UAVs being flown anonymously and could 
solve numerous other issues such as invasion of privacy, ensuring safety regulations are being adhered 
to and determining if a UAV has flown over private property without permission.  
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5.5 PUBLIC NUISANCE 
Once again, only the EU regulations provided guidelines addressing the issue of noise pollution.  
The regulators state that noise emissions generated by UAVs must be limited to the greatest possible 
extent and provide a Noise Test Code within the regulations.  The aim of the Noise Test Code is to direct 
manufacturers on how to measure the noise generated by their UAVs in order to meet the maximum 
sound power levels laid out in the regulations.  Operators are also required to plan their flights to 
minimise nuisance caused by noise pollution.  No other regulations analysed included noise pollution 
reduction guidelines.  Australian regulators directed the user to local noise abatement laws, whilst 
Canada and the UK went the other way and allowed night flights provided safety regulations are adhered 
to.  These night flights can increase the risk of nuisance behaviour through the interruption of peoples 
sleep. 
All regulations included in the analysis provided relief to emergency personnel from the incursion 
of UAVs into airspace near emergency operations or public safety events by prohibiting flights unless 
permission is granted from the person in charge.  Throughout the regulations, nuisance behaviour was 
also tied to noise pollution requiring operators plan flights to reduce nuisances. 
5.6 TRESPASS 
No regulator attempted to address or provide guidelines regarding the issue of trespass.   
5.7 RECOMMENDATIONS 
From the comparative analysis it is clear that deficiencies have been identified in the regulations.  
Existing research aimed to identify and address these deficiencies.  However, there still appears to be 
marginal consensus which is evidenced when the regulations are positioned against the prescribed 
criteria.  What is apparent is regulators within their distinct regulatory environments have attempted to 
amalgamate the necessary guidelines and relevant Acts making it easier for operators to identify 
information relevant to their area of interest.  Some regulations have still proven to be either ambiguous 
in their guidelines placing the burden on the operator to decide on the most appropriate course of action, 
or have become overly complex when trying to address the plethora of issues that present when dealing 
with what is ultimately an extremely complicated matter. 
The following recommendations aim to address the shortfall within the regulations and provide a 
basis for future investigations:   
1. Provide a clear mandate including procedures and guidelines on how to 
mitigate the risk of unmanned aerial vehicles infringing on the privacy rights 
of people. 
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2. Specify guidelines and procedures centred around sound privacy principles 
informing unmanned aerial vehicle operators of their obligations to protect 
a persons’ right to privacy. 
3. Ensure all operators attain a minimum level of knowledge regardless of 
MTOW and usage.   
4. Existing requirements for demonstrating a minimum level of knowledge 
shall include topics beyond the scope of safety and shall include a broader 
level of aeronautical knowledge.   
5. Set a maximum visual line of sight (VLOS) for a UAV under 350 mm in 
diameter to no greater than 400 m in accordance with existing visual acuity 
research to reduce the risk of collision and losing control of the aircraft.  
6. Limit aircraft MTOW to no greater than 2 kg and limit airspeed to 7.5 m/s 
in accordance with existing research thus reducing the potential for impact 
injury.  
7. Place design restraints on UAVs limiting sharp edges, increasing large 
curves and implement frangible parts to absorb impact loads. 
8. Mandate clear loss of control protocols and procedures by incorporating 
manufacturing and design input and provide guidance on how to regain 
control of the UAV including reference to how interference can affect flight 
control. 
9. Require all aircraft regardless of MTOW and usage to incorporate direct 
remote identification allowing real time identification of the operator and 
UAV during flights reducing the risk of privacy, safety and security 
infringements including trespass. 
10. Specify an upper limit on the noise generated by UAVs in accordance with 
existing environmental protection guidelines and reduce noise pollution that 
would otherwise cause harm / nuisance and negatively affect human health. 
 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter demonstrated how the regulations of the selected countries performed against the 
developed criteria.  It proved obvious where the regulations were falling short of the expectations of the 
general public and researchers.  These shortfalls when compared to the developed criteria provided the 
bases for the list of recommendations.  These recommendations provide guidelines on how the 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this project was to examine how the current unmanned aerial vehicle regulations are 
addressing the challenges and issues affecting the use of UAVs.  From these issues criteria were created 
that enabled a comparative analysis between the criteria and the regulations to gain insight into whether 
the regulations were addressing the problems identified.   
Initial research aimed to clarify what those challenges were and found that the primary issues 
were centred on privacy, safety and security.  Researchers found little consensus amongst regulatory 
bodies with the regulations differing greatly between countries.  Privacy issues were a primary concern 
and although it has been extensively researched, UAVs and their privacy implications were tethered 
only lightly to privacy law.  Research surrounding the safety issues found a lack of operator knowledge 
to be the main driver in the increase of near encounters as people are unaware of the regulations or 
unfamiliar with the safety risks (IATA 2018).  Security research regarding UAVs focused on loss of 
control and anonymity which technology was aiming to address.  The challenges and issues found in the 
literature review formed the basis for the criteria used in the comparative analysis.  
    Usage statistics, existing regulations and length of time between regulatory reviews decided 
which countries to include in the analysis. Australia, Canada, EU, UK and the US were chosen to 
analyse.  Criteria were then developed from the issues found in the literature review which included five 
themes: Privacy, Safety, Security, Public Nuisance and Trespass.   
The regulations of the five countries were analysed and compared against the developed criteria 
which demonstrated a shortfall in the regulations with all regulations failing to meet some of the criteria.  
These results confirmed the research that was found in the literature review finding that although there 
have been new regulations developed, privacy, safety and security were still issues needing attention.  
From these results ten recommendations were developed to act as a guide for closing the gaps found in 
the regulations.    
6.2 LIMITATIONS 
Trespass proved to be a complex issue that ultimately fell outside the scope of this project and 
was included for research sake.  Astute researchers and regulators are struggling to define if and how 
UAVs can trespass.  Terrorism was also excluded from the research conducted in this project as it would 
prove difficult to regulate against although the safety recommendations suggested in this project could 
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ENG4111/4112 Research Project 
Project Specification 
For:  Stephen McTegg 
Title:  A Criteria Based Approach to Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Regulations 
Major:  Surveying 
Supervisor: Mr. Shane Simmons 
Enrolment: ENG4111 – EXT S1, 2019 
ENG4112 – EXT S2, 2019 
Project Aim: To define the key challenges affecting UAV use and determine if the 
regulations are addressing those challenges.  
Programme: Version 2, October 2019 
1. Provide a general discussion on the history and regulation of UAVs.  
 
2. Investigate countries that have high UAV usage and have existing well defined UAV 
regulations. 
 
3. Research existing standards and regulations of the selected countries. 
 
4. Examine the problems affecting the use of private and commercial UAVs with respect 
to privacy, security and safety. 
 
5. Develop criteria addressing how these problems can be resolved. 
 
6. Using the criteria, determine if existing UAV standards and regulations are addressing 
the key issues. 
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Appendix F - Criteria 
 
1. Privacy  
a. The regulations shall address the privacy concerns of the general public or provide 
guidelines to reduce the risk of infringing on a person’s right to privacy. 
2. Safety  
a. Operators shall possess a minimum level of knowledge to operate the UAV in a safe 
manner to reduce the risk of injury to people or property.  Knowledge could be 
demonstrated in the form of an online examination, accreditation or a pilot’s 
certificate. 
b. The regulations will contain guidelines reducing the risk of collision including 
onboard collision sensors and alarms. 
c. Maximum visual line of sight shall be defined as visual confirmation of the UAV with 
the naked eye but not further than 400 m. 
d. The regulations will contain limitations on the design of the UAV and the flight 
parameters reducing the risk of harm to people from direct impact. Weight classes and 
flying speed limitations shall be implemented. 
3. Security 
a. The regulations have stipulated guidelines including limitations reducing the risk of 
losing control of the UAV. 
b. The regulations have ensured that UAVs and operators are identifiable and have 
reduced the risk of UAVs being flown anonymously. 
4. Public Nuisance 
a. The regulations will implement guidelines addressing the issue of noise pollution from 
the use of UAVs such as a maximum decibel value from an environmental agency or 
placing limitations on flying times and distances. 
b. The regulations have implemented guidelines reducing the risk of nuisance behaviour 
and specifically mention avoiding emergency personnel or by placing limitations on 
flying times and distances. 
5. Trespass 
a. The regulations will implement limitations and guidelines preventing the act of 
trespass. 
 
